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I. Introduction
United States reliance on constitutional norms in lieu of their
counterparts in international human rights law threatens to leave
Americans bereft of the rights protections enjoyed by citizens of peer
countries. Although it may be shocking to think of the U.S. Constitu-
tion as an obstacle to the acceptance of human rights principles, an
examination of U.S. reservations to human rights conventions proves
that the Constitution is being assigned that very function.
In today's climate it would be exceptional for any country, much
less the United States, to denounce forthrightly the international
human rights norm of women's equality embodied in the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 1 The United States denies resisting women's equality and
has attempted to hide its rejection of the international principle of
equality for women behind the complexities of its Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence. This strategy entails disguising the significant
differences between women's right to equal protection under U.S. law
and the international principle of women's equality. Thus, the United
States is proposing to append RUDs2 to CEDAW, when and if it rati-
fies, that might superficially appear innocuous but would effectively
nullify the CEDAW guarantee of equality.
In relying on invocations of constitutional principles to obscure
the fact that it is refusing to accept the most basic principles of
CEDAW, the United States is using a strategy that has already proved
effective in the case of its RUDs to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).3 The fact that the U.S. invocation
of equal protection jurisprudence enabled it to avoid committing itself
to the norm of women's equality in the ICCPR seems to have been
overlooked both by domestic and international observers. Americans
were apparently thrown off track because of their disinclination to
critically appraise the rights in the U.S. Constitution. In U.S. culture
the Constitution is viewed as a kind of sacred law and the guarantor of
Americans' liberties. It is revered not only as the supreme law of the
land, but a law that is unquestionably superior to all other laws, in-
cluding conflicting principles of international law. Because the U.S.
Constitution-the oldest constitution in the world that is still in
force-has been so influential in shaping constitutionalism abroad,
people outside the United States may likewise tend to accept without
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter CEDAW].
2. This acronym for "reservations, understandings, and declarations" is used to indi-
cate the qualifications and clarifications that the United States routinely imposes when
ratifying international human rights conventions.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; adopted by the United States
Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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question constitutionally-based RUDs and share the view that this ex-
ceptional instrument should be accorded exceptional deference. That
is, people both inside and outside the United States seem disinclined
to suspect that a stated preference for resolving sex discrimination is-
sues under the Equal Protection Clause might merely be a tactic for
disguising a preference to stand by the status quo in U.S. law, a status
quo that denies women the rights that they enjoy under international
human rights law.
Of course, there are other reasons why observers do not associate
the United States with resistance to the international norm of wo-
men's equality. The United States has been energetic in promoting
human rights and condemning rights violations abroad. The dyna-
mism of the U.S. women's movement and the renown-and in some
cases notoriety-achieved by U.S. feminist leaders and writers has
meant that U.S. culture has come to be associated with the feminist
vanguard. Naturally enough, presumptions have been created that
U.S. law coincides with human rights norms and that the protection of
women's rights in the United States must therefore be far advanced.
Few seem inclined to inquire whether the reality of the protections of
women's rights in U.S. law, including constitutional jurisprudence, ac-
tually corresponds to this avant-garde image.
This Article suggests that such an inquiry is long overdue. Specif-
ically, this Article argues that the constitutional grounds for the pro-
posed U.S. reservations to provisions on women's equality in
CEDAW, also known as the Women's Convention, deserve more criti-
cal appraisal than they have heretofore received. As will be shown,
these reservations, commonly referred to in U.S. parlance as RUDs,
relate to a larger, troubling pattern of U.S. legal parochialism in rights
matters and a refusal to consider upgrading U.S. law on rights to meet
higher international norms.
Part I.A. examines the rules on reservations to international trea-
ties. Parts I.B. and I.C. consider CEDAW and the special problems of
CEDAW reservations. Part II reviews the special status of the U.S.
Constitution that makes it akin to an immutable sacred law. Part III
describes how the devotion of Americans to their Constitution has
created obstacles to the adoption of modern rights principles. Part IV
reviews various types of RUDs that the United States has entered to
human rights conventions and provides a context for evaluating the
proposed RUDs to CEDAW. Part V discusses the deficiencies in pro-
tections for women's rights under current U.S. law and equal protec-
tion jurisprudence and shows that these shortcomings correlate with
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the conditions that the United States has placed on its adherence to
the international standard of full equality for women. It also contrasts
women's rights under U.S. law with the higher rights standards pro-
vided by CEDAW. Part VI details the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR and
examines the international reaction to the U.S. position. Finally, in
Part VII, the U.S. reaction to CEDAW and the proposed list of U.S.
RUDs to CEDAW will be examined critically and their significance
assessed.
A. Rules on Reservations to Treaties
To understand the problems in classifying and understanding the
U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR and the proposed RUDs to CEDAW, it is
necessary first to clarify certain basic issues involving treaty reserva-
tions. This clarification requires an introduction to the different types
of treaty reservations.
One obvious way for a state to express disapproval of a treaty
provision is to refuse to ratify the treaty. Another way is to ratify the
treaty, but with a reservation that indicates that the state is not under-
taking to be bound by the offending provision. Article 2(d) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says that a reservation
"means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State."4
Subject to conditions that may vary from one treaty to another, states
may enter reservations when ratifying treaties that restrict or modify
the effects of the treaties. For example, Article 19(a) allows states to
enter reservations unless "[t]he reservation is prohibited by the
treaty."5 Further, Article 19(b) states that a reservation is allowed
unless "[t]he treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do
not include the reservation in question, may be made."6 However,
even where reservations are permitted, they must meet another condi-
tion, set in Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention, that a state may
not formulate a reservation "incompatible with the object and pur-
pose of the treaty."'7 Rather than making such a reservation, a state
should simply decline to become a party to the treaty.
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
5. Id. at 336.
6. Id. at 337.
7. Id.
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Sometimes ratifying states may try to clarify their understanding
of a treaty provision. The issue of where the boundary lies between
treaty reservations and statements that are merely interpretative dec-
larations is debated. Some scholars have proposed that there is no
distinction between the two, claiming that interpretative declarations
amount to reservations under another name.' One author of a trea-
tise on treaty law has proposed that a distinction should be made be-
tween interpretative declarations and reservations. 9 Whereas by
entering a reservation, a state purports "to exclude or to vary the legal
effect of certain provisions of a treaty,"'1 a state clarifies the true
meaning of a treaty by making an interpretative declaration." How-
ever, the same author recognizes that a state may make an interpreta-
tive declaration where a reservation is meant in order to avoid
becoming entangled in the complex rules governing reservations. 2
That is, since interpretations can be entered with fewer constraints
and consequences than reservations, there is an incentive to disguise
reservations as interpretative declarations.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice distinguishes reservations, strictly speak-
ing, from "declarations of a purely explanatory character" that do not
affect the obligations of the treaty for the party concerned, even
though these may also be loosely termed "reservations."' 3 By way of
declarations, states may "say how they understand or propose to inter-
pret or apply the provisions, either generally or in certain events.' 14
According to Sinclair, whether a statement is designated a "reserva-
tion" or not is less important than how it affects a state's obligations:
Whether this will amount strictly to an actual reservation or not
will depend on whether, by way of special interpretation, the
party concerned is really purporting, so far as its own obligations
are concerned, to alter the substantive content or application of
the provision affected; or whether the statement is truly inter-
pretational, and merely clarifies some obscurity, or makes ex-
plicit something that in the clause is only implicit.' 5
In a treatise on treaty reservations, Frank Horn bases the distinc-
tion between interpretative declarations and reservations on how the
8. See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREAnEs 52
(1984).
9. T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 35 (1974).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 52-53 (discussing the views of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice).
14. Id at 53.
15. I&
conditions affect treaty norms.16 He describes a reservation as "a
modification of the norm system expressed in a treaty,"' 7 and as a
statement that introduces "a derogation from a norm.' 8 According
to Horn, a reservation is easy to identify when a statement excludes a
treaty provision, thereby denying a norm,19 but is harder to distinguish
from an interpretative declaration when it merely modifies the con-
tent of a norm.2 °
Horn notes that statements are often hard to classify.2' Confu-
sion may lead states to acquiesce when they confront another state's
obscure reservations or other statements, and even the states making
reservations may have "true difficulties ascertaining the actual charac-
ter of statements."'22 Most states, according to Horn, "do not react to
reservations, interpretative declarations or statements of an obscure
nature." 3 Of particular importance for this Article is the situation in
which a state declares, whether forthrightly or by implication, that its
treaty obligations are limited by its domestic law. As Horn notes,
"statements that declare a treaty to be applicable to the extent that its
provisions do not contradict national legislation are often of an ob-
scure nature." 24 Moreover, declaring states often fail to explain ex-
actly how domestic legislation differs from the treaty, leaving other
states unsure about how they should react.-5
This Article assumes that the distinctions drawn by these scholars
are valid and useful, and that Horn's observations are particularly rel-
evant. For the purposes of this Article, "reservations" will be used to
mean statements that are intended to exclude or restrict the applica-
tion or to modify the meaning of a treaty provision and alter the re-
serving state's obligations under the treaty. "Understandings" or
"declarations" will be used to mean statements that simply indicate
how the state understands the language of the provision and how it
intends to carry out its obligations. "Reservations," as used here, der-
ogate from treaty provisions; "understandings" or "declarations" pres-
ent reasonable interpretations of treaty provisions consistent with the
16. FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATWVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTI-
.ATERAL TREATIES (1988).
17. Id at 237.
18. Id at 245.
19. Id at 263.
20. Id
21. Id at 245.
22. Id at 325.
23. Id at 278.
24. Id at 330.
25. Id
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object and purpose of the provisions. The acronym "RUD"26 will be
used here as a label of convenience for packages of U.S. statements on
treaty obligations.
Careful scrutiny of U.S. RUDs is long overdue. As has been
noted by Louis Henkin, a preeminent expert on human rights law,
there are special reasons not to be complacent about reservations to
treaties on human rights, because "[t]he object and purpose of the
human rights conventions" is to have countries assume "obligations to
respect and ensure recognized rights in accordance with international
standards."27 Allowing states to enter reservations that signal that
they do not intend to comply with human rights conventions therefore
defeats the purpose of setting universal norms in the area of human
rights. Upholding domestic standards in lieu of international rights
standards destroys the aims of human rights treaties. Concerned with
compliance with the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee in 1994
expressed the view that "reservations should not systematically reduce
the obligations undertaken only to those presently existing in less de-
manding standards of domestic law," because to do otherwise would
mean that reservations could lead to "a perpetual non-attainment of
international human rights standards."' 2 The problematic reserva-
tions that gave rise to these comments again became an issue with
regard to CEDAW.
B. CEDAW
Dissatisfied with the rights afforded women under existing human
rights instruments, supporters worked to prepare a special convention
to deal comprehensively with women's human rights.29 CEDAW has
been characterized as offering a "norm of nondiscrimination from a
women's perspective[,] ... a norm that acknowledges that the particu-
lar nature of discrimination against women is worthy of a legal re-
26. See supra note 2.
27. See Louis Henkin, United States Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 343 (1995) [hereinafter United States
Ratification].
28. Id. n.11 (citations omitted).
29. For background on the development of CEDAW, see Laura Reanda, Human
Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations Approach, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 11 (1981). See
also LAPS A. REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
(1993). For a general assessment of the convention, see Sarah C. Zearfoss, The Convention
for [sic] the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Radical, Reason-
able, or Reactionary?, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (1991).
RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
sponse."3 ° CEDAW "progresses beyond the earlier human rights
conventions by addressing the pervasive and systemic nature of dis-
crimination against women, and identifies the need to confront the
social causes of women's inequality by addressing 'all forms' of dis-
crimination that women suffer."31 As of July 1, 1996, 151 countries
had ratified CEDAW.32
Specifically, Article 1 of CEDAW prohibits discrimination against
women, including "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullify-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women.., on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field."' 33 Article 2 requires ratifying states to pursue "by all appropri-
ate means" a "policy of eliminating discrimination against women."'
Such obligations include the Article 2(a) undertaking for states "[t]o
embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their na-
tional constitutions or other appropriate legislation,"3 5 the Article
2(e) obligation "[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women by any person, organization or enter-
prise, '36 and the Article 2(f) obligation "[t]o take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, reg-
ulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women."37 Article 5(a) calls for parties to take all appropriate
measures:
(t)o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.38
Article 16 calls on states to take "all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to mar-
30. Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 155 (1994) [hereinafter State Responsibility].
31. Id.
32. Christina M. Cerna, Of Interest: Human Rights Letter from Washington, 6 HUMAN
RiGHrs INm-RST GROUP NEWSLETTER (American Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.)
Winter 1996, at 4-6.
33. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 36.
34. Idt
35. IM
36. lel
37. Id
38. Id. at 37.
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riage and family relations." 39 Article 16 proceeds to catalogue a series
of issues in which the sexes are to have equal rights, such as the "same
rights and responsibilities during marriage" in Article 16(1)(c), and
the "same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship,
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children" in Article 16(1)(f).40
CEDAW also specifies protections for the equality of women and
men in a variety of areas, such as determining "the nationality of their
children" in Article 9(2);4' having "[a]ccess to the same curricula, the
same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same stan-
dard and school premises and equipment of the same quality" in Arti-
cle 10(b);42 and obtaining "bank loans, mortgages and other forms of
financial credit" in Article 13(b).43 Pursuant to Articles 17 to 21 of
CEDAW, a committee was set up to monitor compliance with the
convention.44
One of the essential features of CEDAW is the positing of one
uniform, international standard of equal rights for women.45 To those
familiar with current debates about whether human rights are or
should be universal, it is notable that CEDAW does not qualify its
endorsement of women's equality by reference to the need to respect
differences in culture, or in religion as a component of culture. The
universalist position on human rights, which CEDAW assumes, was
challenged by various non-Western delegations at the 1993 Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights.46 After debate, the conference
endorsed the universality of human rights by affirming the duty of
states, irrespective of "their political, economic and cultural systems,
to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental free-
doms." 47 However, this endorsement of universality was equivocal
since the conference document also asserted that "the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural
39. Id. at 41.
40. Id.
41. If. at 38.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 40.
44. For an examination of the committee's work, see Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other"
Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
45. See CEDAW, supra note 1, at 33.
46. See Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or
a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. ILr'i L. 307, 371-79, 401 (1994) [hereinafter Univer-
sal Versus Islamic Human Rights]; Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 157-59 (1994).
47. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24, at 3-5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1993).
and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind."'48 This equivoca-
tion has no counterpart in CEDAW. By unambiguously according pri-
ority to securing women's human rights, even where they clash with
local cultural patterns, CEDAW takes an uncompromising stance on
women's entitlement to equality.
One might expect that objections to CEDAW based on cultural
relativist approaches to human rights would be made by Third World
countries. Muslim countries, it might be assumed, would be especially
prone to demand cultural accommodations.' 9 In contrast, objections
by the United States to CEDAW's strong affirmation of women's right
to equality and its universalist stance on women's human rights would
not seem likely, nor would one expect that an American female sena-
tor would complain that CEDAW did not take into account cultural
differences.50 How and why CEDAW's endorsement of women's
equality came to be resisted by the United States will be examined in
the following discussion.
C. Different Types of Reservations to CEDAW
Article 28(2) of CEDAW states: "A reservation incompatible
with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be
permitted."'5 1 Despite this provision, more reservations with the po-
tential to modify or exclude most of the terms of the convention have
been entered to CEDAW than to any other convention. 52 Although
parties may record their objections to CEDAW reservations, abusive
reservations are not discouraged by any mechanism in the convention
enabling parties to challenge the reservations made by other states. In
this regard, CEDAW differs from the race discrimination convention,
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD),
which includes a provision allowing a vote by two-thirds of the parties
to CERD to declare a state's reservation unacceptable for being in-
compatible with the object of the convention.53 The relatively lax
treatment of reservations to CEDAW suggests that the international
48. Id at 1665.
49. The position of several Muslim countries at the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference,
where Muslim states were among those most energetically combatting the positions of del-
egates committed to securing equal rights for women, would provide just one example of
Muslim countries' opposition to international standards supportive of women's rights. See
10 Assoc. FOR MIDDLE EAST WOMEN'S STUD. NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1995, at 1-13.
50. See infra note 454 and accompanying text.
51. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 45.
52. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 317 (1991).
53. Zearfoss, supra note 29, at 925.
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community as a whole regards racial discrimination more seriously
than sex discrimination. Indeed, a feminist critique of how the present
system of international law incorporates male biases and ratifies male
privilege makes the pattern of toleration of reservations to CEDAW
seem an almost inevitable consequence of systemic sexism. 4 Thus,
although the substantive provisions of CEDAW are strongly support-
ive of women's equality, the regime of reservations accommodates
statements indicating that states intend to deviate from CEDAW
norms. Of course, in discussing different countries' reservations to
CEDAW, one does not want to be understood to be making the naive
assumption that there is an automatic, perfect correlation between
countries' CEDAW reservations and their treatment of women, or
that countries which do not enter reservations are necessarily commit-
ted to protecting all the rights set forth in the convention.
Some of the most sweeping reservations to CEDAW have been
entered by Muslim countries.15 For example, in 1989 Libya made a
vague reservation, stating that its accession to CEDAW "is subject to
the general reservation that such accession cannot conflict with the
laws on personal status derived from the Islamic Shariah. 5s6 In 1984,
Bangladesh made remarks that were not expressly classified as a res-
ervation but effectively amounted to one. Bangladesh stated that it
did not consider "as binding upon itself the provisions of articles
2.13(a) and 16.1(c) and (f) as they conflict with Sharia law based on
Holy Quran [sic] and Sunna [the example of the Prophet]. '5 7 In so
doing, Bangladesh posited the incompatibility of CEDAW provisions
and Islamic law, and indicated that it would consider itself bound by
the latter.
These vague "Islamic" reservations were completely open-ended.
They amounted to a pronouncement that the countries would uphold
any relevant domestic laws that were officially deemed to flow from
Islamic requirements at the expense of conflicting CEDAW obliga-
tions. The reservations of Libya and Bangladesh give both countries
54. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM.
J. I'nVL L. 613 (1991).
55. These have been discussed in a variety of law review articles, including Donna J.
Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom" Toward a Framework for Conflict Reso-
lution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INrr'L L. & POL. 795, 807, 843-44 (1992); Clark, supra note 52, at 299-
300, 310-12; Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INr'L L. 643, 687-91, 694-5, 701-06
(1990).
56. Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-Genera Status as of 31 December
1994, at 165, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13 (1995) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
57. Id. at 162.
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unfettered discretion in determining the extent to which they would
be bound by the relevant CEDAW norms, essentially nullifying many
CEDAW principles. Both countries seem to have been seeking the
prestige that accompanies being a party to CEDAW, while entering
reservations that would ensure that they were in reality committing
themselves to nothing.
What seems to be missed in some comments on CEDAW reserva-
tions is that not all reservations are of this magnitude. The Islamic
reservations, as well as the proposed U.S. reservations, are at one ex-
treme. These reservations are distinct from those entered by countries
that are essentially well-disposed towards the goals of CEDAW.
Many of the objections in the latter category are not related to sub-
stantive provisions of CEDAW, but only to procedural sections like
dispute resolution. 8 Other reservations are substantive but relatively
minor in terms of their impact. Some examples can illustrate the dif-
ferences between relatively innocuous reservations and those that
prompt doubts about whether the ratifying state has actually accepted
its obligations under CEDAW.
France entered several reservations upon ratifying CEDAW. For
example, Article 16(1)(g) provides that husband and wife would have
the same personal rights, "including the right to choose a family name,
a profession and an occupation." 9 France indicated that it was enter-
ing "a reservation concerning the right to choose a family name. '60
The impact of this reservation was not hard to ascertain; even after
ratification, French children would retain the name of their father.6
This was a carry over from France's patriarchal tradition. In this nar-
row respect, France would not be in compliance with CEDAW.
Although a woman's right to pass on her name to her children is an
issue of symbolic importance, the overall equality of Frenchwomen
and their ability to function on a par with men in French society does
not depend on equality in this matter. Since France indicated a will-
ingness to accept the major anti-discrimination provisions of CEDAW,
a reservation of this kind did not suggest that France was taking a
stance opposed to the purpose of CEDAW.
Spain's 1984 ratification included one short declaration stating
that CEDAW ratification "shall not affect the constitutional provisions
58. Zearfoss, supra note 29, at 925.
59. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 41.
60. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 164.
61. DOROTHY STETSON, WOMEN's RIGH-rs IN FRANCE, 100-01 (1987).
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concerning succession to the Spanish crown."'62 The intent of this dec-
laration is to accommodate the discriminatory rule that reserves the
right of succession to King Juan Carlos for his son, Crown Prince Fe-
lipe, at the expense of his sisters Cristina and Elena, who are to be
excluded from becoming rulers of Spain by reason of their sex. This
"declaration" is actually a reservation in that it excludes CEDAW
principles from applying to the succession to the throne, and continues
discrimination against women in the royal family. Although this res-
ervation appears potentially damaging to the image of Spanish wo-
men, it is sharply limited in terms of its immediate impact. Out of any
generation, only a few Spanish bluebloods could ever be affected by
this exception to CEDAW rules. Moreover, the power of the Spanish
ruler has dwindled greatly since the days of Queen Isabella. Since the
real seat of power in the Spanish government is the Prime Minister-
ship, which is not restricted to males, a politically ambitious woman is
not barred from rising to the top of the political hierarchy in Spain.
Thus, this reservation created a relatively minor exception to Spain's
general commitment to uphold CEDAW principles.
In its 1980 ratification, the Netherlands recalled its objections to
certain language in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the preamble on the basis
that these provisions introduced "political considerations" that were
"not directly related to the achievement of total equality between men
and women."63 These "objections" registered by the Netherlands
were unusual because they dealt with preambular statements about
arguably irrelevant political issues instead of substantive issues. In
any case, the "objections" in no way affected the willingness of the
Netherlands to comply with CEDAW.
The 1981 Mexican ratification was accompanied by a declaration
that CEDAW would be applied "in accordance with the modalities
and procedures prescribed by Mexican legislation and that the grant-
ing of material benefits in pursuance of the Convention will be as gen-
erous as the resources available to the Mexican State permit."' 6 This
remark seems appropriately classified as a declaration, although one
might have qualms about whether some qualifications of CEDAW
substantive provisions were potentially lurking in the way "Mexican
legislation" would operate. The indication that limited Mexican re-
62. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 167.
63. lId. The CEDAW preamble includes language emphasizing the need to eradicate
apartheid, colonialism, and neo-colonialism and affirmations of the need to strengthen nu-
clear disarmament. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 34.
64. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 166.
sources might constrain Mexico's ability to implement certain affirma-
tive CEDAW mandates does not by itself entail derogating from
CEDAW principles but simply advises that immediate implementation
is not realistic. 65 Anyone acquainted with Mexico's difficult economic
situation would appreciate that this declaration was one that Mexico
could make in good faith.
For these countries, entering such relatively narrow reservations,
objections, or declarations was not incompatible with the execution of
obligations under CEDAW. These reservations differ significantly
from the kind of sweeping reservations that the United States has pro-
posed to enter if it ratifies CEDAW. One should bear in mind these
distinctions when evaluating and classifying the U.S. RUDs with re-
gard to the principle of equal rights for women and men. As the U.S.
RUDs relate to the special, exalted status enjoyed by the U.S. Consti-
tution, it is essential to review the role that devotion to the Constitu-
tion has played in shaping U.S. attitudes toward rights.
H. The U.S. Constitution as Sacred Law
A. Constitutional Venerability and Constitutional Mystique
Americans tend to regard the U.S. Constitution as the preemi-
nent safeguard of their rights and freedoms. Given this, it would sur-
prise many to discover that the Constitution has been recently
deployed as a screen to filter out the more exigent standards for
human rights that are afforded under international law. Americans
seem disinclined critically to appraise the scope of the rights protec-
tions in the U.S. Constitution in light of modern human rights norms
established in international law. Few appear prepared to adjust their
thinking to accept the notion that the protections in the Bill of Rights
may have become outmoded. An American who dares assert that re-
liance on the U.S. Constitution means that U.S. rights are falling sig-
nificantly below modern international rights norms risks being
charged with heresy.
How did Americans come by the idea that their Constitution was
not to be judged by the standards of international law? The antiquity
of the Constitution may be one factor. The U.S. Constitution was
65. For example, Mexico may have been worried about its ability "[t]o introduce ma-
ternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits" as required by Article 11(2)(b)
or to ensure to rural women the right "[t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in
relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communica-
tions," as required by Article 14(2)(h). CEDAW, supra note 1, at 39, 41.
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composed in 1789 and is the oldest constitution remaining in force.6
In contrast, most countries deemed it essential to rewrite their consti-
tutions after World War II.67 Viewed in its original eighteenth century
context, the Constitution was a revolutionary breakthrough, a brilliant
and eloquent exposition of daring new concepts. That it should have
inspired such admiration and emulation around the world is not sur-
prising. However, when viewed in relation to the constitutional ac-
complishments of other nations during the last decades of the
twentieth century, this same document looks rather different. Having
survived more than two centuries, the U.S. Constitution contains
many features that relate to the problems of a bygone era. It refers to
the slave trade and the slave populations of the south,68 admonishes
the Federal Government not to confer titles of nobility,69 and prohib-
its laws working "corruption of the blood. ' 70 In contrast, it fails to
address vital contemporary issues such as the "economic support sys-
tems and safety nets" that are needed in a modem welfare state and
that are provided for in the constitutions of other North Atlantic
nations.71
Speculation as to why the U.S. Constitution has survived without
revision for more than two centuries prompts the conclusion that it
possesses a different status than other constitutions. It is a venerable
symbol of the nation. An original version on parchment is carefully
preserved and impressively displayed in the National Archives beyond
the huge doors in the columned south facade. The high-ceilinged,
dimly-lit display chamber is reminiscent of the interior of a Greek
temple, where one might expect to encounter a statue of the goddess
Artemis. Americans from around the country come to gaze at the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence.
They stand silently in line, often with young children in tow, awaiting
their opportunity to approach the display cases and feast their eyes on
66. To celebrate its status as the oldest constitution, plans were made in 1994 to have a
special annual constitutional day celebration. See National Constitutional Center, Philadel-
phia, Receives National Park Foundation Grant for Constitution Day Celebration, PR New-
swire, July 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
67. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in 7iventieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. Cmi. L.
RFv. 516, 520 (1992). Glendon observes that most of the world's constitutions have been
adopted since 1965. Id. Of course, the U.S. political system has been uniquely stable since
the end of the eighteenth century, making rewriting the U.S. Constitution seem less urgent
than rewriting constitutions in countries that have undergone major upheavals since 1789.
68. See U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cI. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
69. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
70. See id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
71. Glendon, supra note 67, at 520; Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs
and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Ci-i. L. REv. 453, 516 (1992).
the faded script of the original documents.7' Although Americans
consider this worshipful attitude normal, it is actually unusual.73
How the Constitution is venerated is illustrated by the public con-
sternation over the 1995 news that scientific examination revealed that
the parchment and ink were deteriorating despite preservation in spe-
cial cases with tinted glass and infused with inert gasses designed to
keep the originals in optimum condition.74 Further indication of how
the documents are treasured is the nightly procedure of sinking the
display cases underground into reinforced vaults so that the docu-
ments can survive even if the surrounding city of Washington is oblit-
erated by a nuclear attack. Given the attention that is paid to
preserving the documents, one could argue that the Constitution is
treated more like a holy relic than a secular document laying out a
scheme of government.
The term "sacred" is often used to characterize the Constitution.
Thomas Grey has observed that the U.S. Constitution is not simply a
"hierarchically superior statute"-being unlike state constitutions,
which people tend to perceive in this manner-but that it is "a sacred
symbol, the most potent emblem (along with the flag) of the nation
itself."75 As Grey points out, when Americans say "the Constitution,"
no one asks "which Constitution?" '7 6 If it is ultimately more like a
sacred object than like a normal constitution, this could go some way
toward explaining why the U.S. Constitution has survived so long. Af-
ter all, sacred law is inherently difficult to change, because change is
not easily reconciled with sacred status. As in the case of the King
James version of the Bible, its very archaisms and obscurities may
even enhance its prestige and authority. Grey seems right in charac-
terizing the Constitution as "one of the totems of our tribe."77 The
mystique associated with this venerability may account for the wide-
spread failure of Americans to consider adopting a new Bill of Rights.
Scholars who are exposed to modern rights concepts are more
likely than other Americans to notice the gap that has opened be-
tween U.S. domestic law and international human rights, and to have
72. Richard B. Bernstein is among the scholars who have remarked on this pattern.
See RICHARD B. BERNsTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTTUTION SO Mucii, Wiiy Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 3-4 (1993).
73. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1984).
74. Warren E. Leary, Nation's Vital Documents Get Checkups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1995, at C1.
75. Grey, supra note 73, at 3. See also sources cited id. nn.4-5.
76. Ma. at 17.
77. Id.
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a jaundiced perspective on the adequacy of the Constitution as a foun-
dation for modern rights. For example, the distinguished international
law scholar Richard Lillich has observed that "to the extent that the
Constitution embraced slavery and countenanced the denial of wo-
men's rights, it actually was anti-human rights in content. ' 78 As Lil-
lich has maintained, "[w]hile contemporary observers of the United
States constitutional system praise its concern with individual human
rights, it should be recalled that the Constitution itself does not begin
to address such concerns in what one today would consider an accept-
able manner. '7 9
Feminists seem more disposed than most to appraise the Consti-
tution critically. For example, Mary Becker has written one of the
rare negative evaluations of the merits of the Bill of Rights to appear
in American law reviews.80 Noting how the Constitution is venerated,
she maintains that its invocation legitimizes the status quo and that it
magnifies historical inequities and affirms women's subordinate sta-
tus.81 The Bill of Rights, according to Becker's analysis, often "per-
petuates or even magnifies social inequities rather than eliminating
them. When this happens, the Bill of Rights becomes part of the
problem, rather than the solution."' Such critical perspectives are
uncommon in a legal culture where the perfection of the Constitution
tends to be taken for granted.
B. The Scantiness of Constitutional Rights Provisions
The rights adumbrated in the Bill of Rights are few. Many mod-
em rights such as the right to privacy, the presumption of innocence,
and freedom to travel are not set forth in the text of the Constitution,
but instead have been developed by judicial rulings and are subject to
change. Moreover, where rights are established in U.S. law, they are
often weaker or less comprehensive than rights under the formula-
tions in the international instruments.83 In addition, Americans are
lacking in protection for social welfare rights, such as the rights to
78. Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights
Law, 3 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 53, 54 (1990).
79. Id. Here, Lillich is endorsing comments made by Henkin in Louis Henkin, Rights:
American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 407 (1979) [hereinafter Rights].
80. Becker, supra note 71, at 453.
81. Id. at 454.
82. Id at 514.
83. The protections for equality in the ICCPR and CEDAW that are discussed in this
Article exemplify how much stronger international standards of rights often are than those
in U.S. domestic law. See discussions infra part V comparing U.S. law and relevant provi-
sions of the ICCPR and CEDAW.
food, clothing, housing, decent working conditions, and health care.84
In his 1944 State of the Union message, President Franklin Roosevelt,
perceiving the deficiencies of the Bill of Rights, called for amending
the Constitution to provide social and economic rights.85 With his
death, prospects for undertaking a project of this historic magnitude
dwindled.
The disinclination of Americans to incorporate human rights
norms into their Constitution means that they may have rights that lag
behind the panoply of modem rights recognized in the constitutions of
other Western nations. Moreover, Americans also lack the extensive
rights now provided to citizens of newly democratized countries for-
merly notorious for their retrograde positions on human rights.8 6
One reason why the deficiencies of the rights protections af-
forded in the Bill of Rights are overlooked is the national prominence
and international prestige obtained by the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence on rights and freedoms during the era of the Warren Court
from 1954 to 1969.87 In that era, the Court effectively federalized the
Bill of Rights and made notable and widely-hailed contributions to
modern rights concepts.88 Progressive ruling on rights continued in
the Burger Court. Writing in 1984, Grey presciently anticipated that
"we may be approaching the end of a historically deviant period in
which the federal courts have been a progressive force in American
life."'89 One critic of the current treatment of rights questions sees in
it a "static originalism," involving judicial reliance on so-called neutral
principles that tend to ratify "existing distributions of wealth and
power" that were acquired based on the domination and subordina-
tion of certain groups, without inquiry into whether the "existing dis-
tribution of entitlements" rested on injustice.90 The progressive
jurisprudence that to a considerable extent had compensated for the
archaisms of the Bill of Rights seems to be at an end. Meanwhile, the
American legal system disregards advances in rights jurisprudence in
Europe that are based on ideas that Europeans originally took from
the United States during the era of the Warren Court.91
84. See Henkin, Rights, supra note 79, at 416-18.
85. 90-I CONG. REc. 55, 57 (1944).
86. For examples of these provisions, see infra note 211.
87. Lillich, supra note 78, at 55-56.
88. Id. at 56.
89. Grey, supra note 73, at 24.
90. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Funda-
mentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 99-101 (1993).
91. See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 537, 543-44, 560 (1988).
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In sharp contrast to the United States, democratic nations that
are not alienated from the international legal system do not treat in-
ternational human fights as a force threatening the integrity of their
constitutions and domestic systems of rights. Instead, their constitu-
tions may treat international human rights as friendly entities and en-
dorse them by express constitutional provisions.' A generally
sympathetic British observer has noted that the United States "re-
mains sadly isolated" from the direct impact of "the rapidly develop-
ing corpus of international human rights law.193 He expects that,
absent improvements in the 1990s, the U.S. Constitution will be found
deficient "as a charter of ordered liberty, suitable to the needs and
values of the citizens of the United States in the twenty-first cen-
tury."94 It is a sign of the insularity and parochialism shaping Ameri-
cans' vision of rights issues that few seem to be either interested in or
perturbed by the relative weakness of the rights provisions in the U.S.
Constitution.95
A recent draft of a "Charter of Rights and Responsibilities"-a
proposed bill of rights for the next century drawn up by Circuit Court
Judge Richard Nygaard-can be read as an implicit criticism of the
parsimonious rights protections currently afforded Americans. 96 Un-
like the average U.S. judge, Nygaard is personally familiar with issues
in drafting modern constitutions, which may explain his view that non-
92. For example, the Spanish Constitution of 1979 in Article 10(2), states "The norms
relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognized by the Constitution, shall be
interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the inter-
national treaties and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain." SPAIN CONST. art. 10
(2), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNrmS OF Tm WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996).
The 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic provides in Article 10 that human rights
treaties may override domestic law "Ratified and promulgated international treaties on
human rights and fundamental freedoms to which the Czech Republic is obligated are
directly binding and take precedence over the law." CZECH CONsT. art. 10, reprinted in id.
Germany, in Article 25 of its 1949 Basic Law, lays down the welcome mat for interna-
tional law generally, regardless of whether it is in treaty form: "The general rules of inter-
national law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall override the laws and
directly establish rights and obligations .... " F.R.G. CONST. art. 25, reprinted in id.
93. Lester, supra note 91, at 539.
94. Id. at 560-61.
95. See Glendon, supra note 67, at 519. She introduced an article on a Bill of Rights
symposium in Chicago by pointing out that, had the symposium been held at a university
outside the United States, it would have almost certainly involved cross-national compari-
sons and considerations of how commitments to international human rights law had af-
fected national legal systems. Id. In contrast, such international perspectives on rights are
exceptional among U.S. lawyers and judges.
96. See generally Richard L. Nygaard, A Bill of Rights for the Twenty-First Century, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189 (1994).
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U.S. models of rights are more complete and offer better guidance
than their U.S. counterparts. However, such perspectives are unusual,
and the idea that U.S. domestic rights protections should be respon-
sive to modem trends in international law may strike many Americans
as subversive. The background against which U.S. legal parochialism
in rights matters has developed will be briefly outlined below to show
how the U.S. refusal to accept the norm of equality is part of a much
broader pattern.
IlI. U.S. Attitudes Towards International Human
Rights Conventions
A. U.S. Ambivalence Towards Human Rights
Because the United States was one of the leaders in founding the
United Nations, it is associated with the founding of the post-war sys-
tem of international law in which human rights have figured promi-
nently. The United States has long put great store by upholding
democratic institutions and securing civil and political rights, and is
regarded by many as the homeland of the values set forth in modem
international human rights conventions. This impression that the
United States cares deeply about human rights has been further en-
hanced by the vigorous, albeit selective, propagation of human rights
as part of U.S. foreign policy and the linking of trade privileges to
human rights performance. The State Department also publishes de-
tailed reviews of the human rights situations in countries around the
world.97 Many outside the United States have come to associate
human rights with U.S. culture, which has led governments of non-
Western countries and cultural relativists to complain that the exten-
sion of human rights to non-Western countries necessarily involves
American cultural imperialism.98 Ironically, as those familiar with the
U.S. record recognize, the United States has shown extreme reluc-
tance to integrate modem human rights within its domestic legal sys-
tem, and has remained largely estranged from the modern system of
international human rights law.99 In this regard, the U.S. position re-
sembles that of the United Kingdom, which has not hesitated to
preach to the newly democratizing nations of Eastern Europe about
97. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CouNmY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACICES
(published annually).
98. See infra note 115; Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, supra note 46,
at 315-18, 379-88.
99. See infra part Ill; Lester, supra note 91.
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the need to incorporate European human rights in their domestic laws
while refusing to do so itself.100
The influence of groups and institutions opposed to human rights
and their dire warnings about the dangers of international human
rights has fostered an attitude of suspicion, if not downright hostility,
towards the international conventions. Any U.S. president advocating
ratification of human rights conventions must contend with a climate
of negativity that has been created by forces determined to convince
the U.S. public that it has everything to lose and nothing to gain by
such ratification. Aspects of the history of the U.S. response to inter-
national human rights will be reviewed in the next section. This his-
tory helps explain the resistance the United States has shown toward
ratifying CEDAW.
B. Opposition to Ratifying Human Rights Conventions
A review of U.S. attitudes towards human rights conventions
reveals that the U.S. reaction to CEDAW was no aberration but was
part and parcel of a traditional assumption that ratifying human rights
treaties constituted a radical and dangerous project. The dismal rec-
ord of the U.S. Senate and other institutions, like the American Bar
Association, with regard to proposed ratifications of international
human rights conventions has been addressed in Natalie Kaufman's
thought-provoking study, which makes for discouraging reading for
any advocate of strengthening the international system of human
rights. 01 In her study, Kaufman surveys the rhetoric of U.S. oppo-
nents of human rights and chronicles the tactics deployed to discredit
human rights and to deprive any human rights conventions that
achieved ratification of domestic effect. Kaufman's work reminds
readers just how intensely appeals to parochial and ethnocentric senti-
ments have resonated in the U.S., and how these appeals have
poisoned the well for those seeking to extend the benefits of human
rights treaties to Americans. She demonstrates how the common as-
sumption that U.S. constitutional rights are indubitably superior has
been exploited to persuade Americans that international human rights
would be, at best, useless and, at worst, dangerous threats to their
freedoms.
100. See David Rose, Rule of Law: Two-Faced Britain in the Dock over Human Rights,
THE OBSERVER, Oct. 1, 1995, at 16.
101. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE:
A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990). The ABA subsequently reversed its position and now
supports international human rights and CEDAW ratification. See infra note 131.
For example, the ABA and Frank Holman, a former ABA presi-
dent and an influential member of the ABA, played a prominent role
in the 1940s and 1950s in persuading Americans to fear international
human rights. °2 Holman characterized human rights treaties as part
of a Communist plot to destroy the American way of life.'0 3 To shield
Americans from the nefarious impact of international human rights, a
constitutional amendment was proposed by an ABA committee that
would have prevented ratification of human rights treaties or at least
would have limited their domestic impact. °4 With the support of the
ABA, Ohio Senator John Bricker in 1951 tried to make it impossible
for the United States to adhere to international human rights treaties
by introducing a constitutional amendment to protect the "sacred
rights enjoy[ed] under the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.' 0 5 Re-
calling the special, sacred status of the U.S. Constitution, one can ap-
preciate how senators might believe that any scheme of rights
entailing an amendment of the U.S. Constitution must be unholy.
U.S. opponents of international human rights covenants have not
minced words in proclaiming that the covenants menaced U.S. rights
and freedoms. The proposed Covenant on Human Rights, which was
later subdivided into the ICCPR and International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), was anathema to Sena-
tor Bricker and his ilk. Demanding that the executive branch
withdraw from work on the covenant, Bricker called it "a Covenant
on Human Slavery,"' 06 a legalization of "the most vicious restrictions
of dictators." 07 It was also a "legal basis for the most repressive
measures of atheistic tyranny,' s08 "a blueprint for tyranny,"' 0 9 and
"an attempt to repeal the Bill of Rights."" 0 Bricker's tirades were not
unusual: a favorite argument of foes of ratification of human rights
treaties is that ratification would jeopardize U.S. constitutionalism."'
Again and again, supposed threats to the Constitution were espied
102. Id. at 16.
103. Id at 16-19, 23.
104. Id at 25.
105. Id. at 29. For further discussion of the notorious Bricker Amendment, see Henkin,
United States Ratification, supra note 27, at 348-49.
106. KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id
111. See MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 50-63 (1987).
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and decried.112 Frank Holman of the ABA suggested that "the cove-
nant would destroy [both] the U.S. Constitution and legal system."" 3
In an article published in the ABA Journal in 1951, William Fleming
foresaw apocalyptic consequences and proclaimed that the covenant
would whittle away American liberties and, even worse:
[Tihe Declaration of Independence will be legislated out of
existence .... The war of 1776 will have been fought in vain,
the principles of the Revolution undone, self-government abol-
ished, with the international bureaucracy as the new sovereign
in the field of human rights taking the place of George III."
Moreover, according to Fleming, the ideology of the covenant
was alien to the United States. The Soviets had "scored" with the
covenant, which he maintained was marked by "the heavy imprint of
Eastern philosophy."" 5
So effective have these strategies been that the United States has
hesitated to ratify even those human rights conventions that stated
basic principles to which no reasonable citizen of the modern world
could take exception. One such example is the Genocide Convention,
a convention signed under President Truman but not ratified until
1988, and then only with significant reservations. 11 6 Opponents of
human rights succeeded in drastically changing U.S. attitudes toward
the Genocide Convention. While overwhelmingly supportive of the
Genocide Convention initially, public opinion was subsequently per-
suaded to regard the convention with fear. As Kaufman remarks, the
public image of the Genocide Convention was completely deformed
due largely to ABA efforts, and the convention transformed "from a
simple document outlawing a heinous offense to a subversive docu-
ment undermining cherished constitutional rights."" 7 This meant that
the Genocide Convention could be dismissed as un-American. Wild
charges were levied that the Constitution was imperiled by the Geno-
cide Convention." 8
112. Id.
113. KAuFMAN, supra note 101, at 69.
114. Id. at 70-71.
115. Id. at 72. This was a remarkable claim, given the historical origins of human rights,
which derive from Western European and American thought. This has made them seem
excessively "Western" in the eyes of many in non-Western societies. See, eg., Willy Wo-
Lap Lam, A New World Order Begins in Beijing, SouTH CHINA MORNING POsW, Nov. 23,
1994, at 23, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File; William May, Clash of
Cultures Unfolds in Asian Media, Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 20, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
116. KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 181-94, 206-10.
117. Id. at 62.
118. Id. at 49.
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When the Senate was considering ratification of the Genocide
Convention, Senator Jesse Helms demanded that a list of reservations
be entered." 9 However, he ultimately refused to support ratification
of the convention even with extensive reservations.120 The reserva-
tions included one assertion that nothing in the Genocide Convention
required or authorized legislation or action prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution as interpreted by our courts.' 2 ' Helms trumpeted that
via this proviso, "we would put the international community on notice
that we regard our system as a superior protection of human rights
than [sic] any other system in the world.""2 Helms is not unusual in
automatically ascribing superiority to U.S. rights. In an analysis of
arguments made in 1953 and 1979 in Senate hearings against ratifying
human rights treaties, Kaufman found that the most common argu-
ment deployed was that international human rights would diminish
basic rights.'13
C. Resistance to Enhanced Rights as a Motive for Opposing Human
Rights Conventions
Statements by human rights opponents to the effect that U.S.
rights were superior to those in human rights conventions were tinged
with hypocrisy. Behind the combative rhetoric, which attempted to
portray international human rights as a menace to American rights
and freedoms, was an awareness that international law established a
stringent norm of equality that U.S. law could not begin to meet. Re-
gimes of de jure racial segregation and racially discriminatory laws
remained in place throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and in some places
persisted into the 1970s. The real problem was that U.S. law lagged
behind international norms and denied rights to many Americans who
would be in a position to claim equal rights if they enjoyed the protec-
tion of international law. Thus, Americans opposed to civil rights for
Black Americans were naturally inclined to oppose international
human rights. 124 However, it would have been impolitic to admit
openly the goal of preserving a discriminatory system that denied
rights to Black Americans. Only rarely were those condemning inter-
119. Id. at 148.
120. Id
121. Id. at 209. The reservations proposed by Senator Helms and Senator Richard
Lugar are listed id. at 209-10.
122. Id at 184.
123. Id at 177.
124. Thomas Buergenthal, The United States and International Human Rights, 9 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 141, 144 (1988).
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national human fights moved to confess that they were acting on the
basis of opposition to expanded civil fights for Black Americans. 12
However, fear that Black Americans could find mechanisms offering
them relief under international law for wrongs irremediable under do-
mestic law was a major factor accounting for the otherwise strange
delay in ratifying the Genocide Convention.126
In 1951 the ABA published an article condemning the Human
Rights Covenant, the precursor of the ICCPR and ICESCR, in part
because the covenant promoted "extreme egalitarianism."' 27 The op-
ponents of human rights believed that the law should ideally accom-
modate racial discrimination and that international law was "extreme"
in making non-whites more equal than they were entitled to be.128 In
other words, when Americans made objections to ratifying human
rights conventions, they did not necessarily believe their own state-
ments that international human rights would undermine superior U.S.
protections for rights. The objections often seem to have resulted
from an awareness that international human rights distributed rights
and freedoms differently, bestowing them equally on all races and
thereby threatening the privileged status of White Americans.
In the current U.S. legal order, where de jure racial discrimina-
tion is outlawed but the law permits sex discrimination to survive,'129 it
is not surprising that the basis for objecting to international human
rights has changed. Now, the objectionable "extreme egalitarianism"
of international human rights lies in the provisions for full equality of
the sexes. In the U.S. objections to CEDAW, there has been no ex-
press condemnation of the norm of equality for women, but there is
much to indicate that objections to that norm have prompted the op-
position to CEDAW ratification.
D. Political Components of United States Attitudes Towards
Human Rights
Just as it is wrong to assume that U.S. culture is monolithically
supportive of human rights, so one must not overgeneralize about
U.S. hostility to human rights. To provide examples that show that the
125. For example, an ABA committee member did raise the specter of "subversive ele-
ments" teaching minorities that international law covered the area of civil rights. KAuF-
MAN, supra note 101, at 46.
126. ad at 18, 43-46, 54-55, 56-59.
127. Id. at 70. It is not coincidental that the ABA in this period was itself involved in
racially discriminatory practices. Id. at 25-26.
128. Id. at 70.
129. For an elaboration of this, see the discussion infra part V.A.
United States has often seemed more a foe than a friend of interna-
tional human fights and has resisted modifying its laws to bring them
into conformity with international standards is not to say that the U.S.
response to international human rights has been uniformly negative.
Many U.S. politicians and officials have strongly backed human rights,
one of the most famous of whom was Eleanor Roosevelt, a prime
mover behind the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR).130 U.S. non-government organizations, lawyers and
law professors, religious and civil rights organizations, and feminist
groups have sought to promote the acceptance of human rights and to
achieve ratification of the international human rights conventions. 13
The evidence suggests that Americans who are philosophically in-
clined to believe that the principles in human rights conventions are
beneficial tend not to find that there are significant obstacles in the
way of U.S. ratification. 132 Notably, these individuals view the U.S.
Constitution in a different fashion from the way that opponents of
human fights do. Such Americans do not see the U.S. Constitution as
a filter that is meant to screen out expanded rights, nor as an obstacle
to U.S. citizens enjoying the full benefits of the protections offered by
international human rights law. For example, President Kennedy, a
supporter of human rights, was even prepared to assert that U.S. law
was already in conformity with international human rights law, so that
ratifying the conventions could entail no conflicts with the U.S.
Constitution.133
There are political dimensions to the cleavage between Ameri-
cans who favor and Americans who oppose human rights. Democrats
have been more inclined toward ratifying international human rights
conventions than Republicans, who have tended also to oppose do-
130. KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 71.
131. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Amnesty International, and the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights have been particularly active in this regard, and the
ABA, notorious decades ago for its opposition to ratifying human rights treaties, has now
also become supportive. Among the organizations listed by the National Committee on
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women as
supporting CEDAW ratification are the American Association of Retired Persons, the
American Association of University Women, the ABA, the ACLU, Amnesty Interna-
tional, Black Women's Agenda, Inc., B'nai B'rith Women, the Episcopal Church (USA),
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the League of Women Voters, the National
Organization for Women (NOW), and the Presbyterian Church. NATIONAL COMM. ON
U.N. CEDAW, FAct SHEET, Oct. 1995.
132. See, e.g., HALBERSTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111; Hoffman & Strossen, infra note
140; Henkin, United States Ratification, supra note 27; and the Lawyers Committee letter to
Senator Pell, infra note 413.
133. HALBERSTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111, at 173.
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mestic laws and court decisions enhancing civil rights. Naturally, U.S.
policy on human rights has been affected by shifts in control of the
executive branch. For example, the Carter Administration was most
active in support of international human rights, including CEDAW.13
4
In contrast, during the Reagan Administration, Lillich saw "'benign
neglect' or even outright hostility towards the development, clarifica-
tion, and domestic enforcement of international human rights law. ' 13 5
The Bush Administration took the long-delayed step of ratifying the
ICCPR, albeit with significant reservations. 136 After President Clin-
ton took office and the White House returned to Democratic control,
the executive branch again advocated ratifying CEDAW.137 However,
regardless of shifts in support of ratifying human rights instruments,
the U.S. practice of appending constitutional and other reservations
seems to be a constant. Thus, the Clinton Administration, although
friendlier to human rights than its Republican predecessors, has pro-
posed significant RUDs to CEDAW.13 8 The significance of U.S.
RUDs to human rights treaties deserves examination, particularly as
the RUDs bear on the U.S. effort to mislead the international commu-
nity as to where U.S. law stands vis--vis the norm of women's
equality.
IV. U.S. RUDs and International Human
Rights Conventions
A. U.S. "Cluttering" of Human Rights Conventions
Given the extent of opposition to U.S. ratification of human
rights treaties, it is not surprising that the United States has ratified
relatively few of them. Moreover, U.S. ratifications of human rights
conventions have been something other than foursquare endorse-
ments of the principles contained therein. U.S. ratifications have been
accompanied by RUDs that often nullified U.S. commitments to abide
by treaty norms.13 9 The U.S. RUDs to human rights treaties are de-
134. Lillich, supra note 78, at 68.
135. Id. at 54.
136. See discussion infra part VI.A.
137. See infra notes 387-388.
138. See infra part VII.B.
139. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 1169, 1179-80
(1993).
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scribed as being "designed to ensure that these treaties would have
virtually no domestic legal effect in enhancing human rights."' 4 °
Louis Henkin has characterized the practice of appending these
RUDs as the "clutter[ing]" of treaties.' 4 ' Further, the result of this
"cluttering" has been said "to confuse the precise nature, content, and
international and domestic legal significance of treaties ratified by the
United States."'42 As will be indicated,14 3 the murky and misleading
language of the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR and CEDAW equality pro-
visions appears to have been intentionally crafted to confuse the inter-
national community about what exact obligations the United States
was undertaking as to women's rights. Thus, the U.S. RUDs raise
doubts about the good faith of U.S. treaty ratifications. For example,
Cherif Bassiouni has charged: "The Senate's practice of de facto re-
writing treaties, through reservations, declarations, understandings,
and provisos, leaves the international credibility of the United States
shaken and its reliability as a treaty-negotiating partner with foreign
countries in doubt.""' Louis Henkin has observed that the U.S. use
of RUDs "has evoked criticism abroad and dismayed supporters of
ratification in the United States. As a result of these qualifications of
its adherence, U.S. ratification has been described as specious, mere-
tricious, hypocritical."' 45 Through the U.S. RUDs, Henkin concludes,
the United States may be signalling to the rest of the world that the
conventions apply only to other states, and that the United States may
"sit in judgment on others, but will not submit its behavior to interna-
tional judgment."' 46
In sum, the RUDs entered by the United States to international
human rights conventions have been so sweeping and so deleterious
that they raise doubts about the good faith of U.S. ratifications, while
making it hard for the outside world to estimate the degree to which
the United States intends to adhere to international norms. The
RUDs entered to the ICCPR are regarded as such a serious problem
140. Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights Law
in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXr CENTURY 478 (Louis
Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994). According to Kaufman, the U.S. package
of attachments to human rights covenants "makes a mockery of the international human
rights consensus." KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 197.
141. Louis HENKIN, CoNsTrTUTIoNALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50
(1990).
142. Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1174.
143. See discussion infra part VI.A.
144. Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1173.
145. Henkin, United States Ratification, supra note 27, at 341.
146. Id at 344.
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by ICCPR supporters in the United States that they have even de-
bated whether it would have been better for the United States not to
have ratified the ICCPR at all rather than ratify it in a manner that
nullified the convention. 147
B. The Rationales Behind the U.S. RUDs
While many RUDs flowed from opposition to principles in
human rights conventions, not all were proposed in a spirit of animos-
ity towards human rights. Instead, reservations were also proposed by
human rights supporters in the belief that RUDs were essential to dis-
arm Senate critics.148 Americans wishing to promote ratification of
human rights conventions have tended to think defensively, believing
it necessary to load the conventions with reservations that they them-
selves might prefer to omit.
Louis Henkin has outlined the principles prompting the United
States to enter the plethora of RUDs to international human rights
conventions. 49 These principles include the rule that the United
States "will not undertake any treaty obligation that it will not be able
to carry out because it is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution"' 10
and the rule that U.S. adherence to any human rights treaty should
not require changes in existing U.S. laws, policies, or practices. These
two rules can be confused, so that a preference for upholding the legal
status quo becomes associated with upholding the Constitution.
Moreover, RUDs might refer to the Constitution even where the do-
mestic legal standard was not one compelled by the Constitution, but
merely one held not to offend constitutional norms.'5 '
Other principles listed by Henkin are that the United States will
not submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with
regard to human rights conventions, that the U.S. system of federalism
must be upheld, and that human rights conventions will be non-self-
147. See Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1181.
148. See KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 151.
149. See Henkin, United States Ratification, supra note 27.
150. Id at 341-42.
151. Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1177, and sources cited id. n.29. Henkin's assessment
that defense of the Constitution and the status quo in U.S. law are central to U.S. RUDs to
human rights conventions is shared by others. For example, according to Bassiouni, with
regard to the conventions on genocide and torture, as well as the ICCPR: "The overriding
concern of Senators like Jesse Helms, Orrin Hatch, and Richard Lugar, who have effec-
tively prevented ratification of these treaties without the plethora of what are really
amendments, was that no treaty be supreme to the Constitution or the domestic laws of the
United States." Id.
executing.15 2 Since these last principles relate to modalities of imple-
mentation and are less relevant for the comparisons of the U.S. RUDs
to the substantive principles of equality central to this Article, they
are de-emphasized in the following discussion.
C. Dissection of "Constitutional" Bases for U.S. RUDs
As befits the legal system of a nation given to Constitution-wor-
ship, in U.S. law it is treated as self-evident that international law may
not override the Constitution. 53 In fact, the principle that the Consti-
tution overrides international law has also been endorsed by the
Supreme Court.'54 Despite this explicit policy that the U.S. Constitu-
tion will override any conflicting norms of international law, oppo-
nents of ratifying international human rights conventions have played
on fears that such ratification could somehow undermine the Consti-
tution.'55 Predictably, U.S. RUDs uphold the supremacy of constitu-
tional principles even though these RUDs would seem to be
redundant.
Henkin has noted that behind what is presented as a constitution-
ally-based reservation, there may be altogether different grounds for
objecting to treaty provisions.:5 6 No threat to the Constitution need
actually be present, and the real grounds for a constitutional reserva-
tion may amount to nothing more than a resistance to changing U.S.
law to bring it up to international standards. 57 Furthermore, as will
be discussed,' 58 the "constitutional" objections to provisions in human
rights treaties may relate not to any express text of the Constitution,
but instead to contested judicial interpretations of constitutional re-
quirements. The U.S. has chosen not to exploit domestic disputes
over the validity of these constitutional interpretations to call for the
rethinking of U.S. standards that fail to comply with international
human rights law.
One must question whether the U.S. "constitutional" rationales
for reservations to human rights treaties are not merely pretextual and
ultimately contrived to give respectability to a preference for adhering
to the norms of domestic law regardless of whether or not they are
constitutionally mandated. That is, the "constitutional" reservations
152. Henkin, United States Ratification, supra note 27, at 341.
153. Id. at 342.
154. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
155. See discussion supra part II.B.
156. Henkin, United States Ratification, supra note 27, at 342.
157. Id
158. See infra notes 174-178 and 403-412 and accompanying text.
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might have been offered for much the same reason as the "Islamic"
reservations made by Muslim countries to human fights treaties-to
give respectability to policies of upholding domestic laws that are dis-
criminatory or otherwise deficient by international human fights stan-
dards by associating these policies with sacred laws. 59
The U.S. proclivity to stand by outmoded domestic law in lieu of
upgrading it to meet international standards is troubling to some non-
governmental human fights advocacy groups. For example, the Law-
yers Committee on Human Rights wrote to Senator Claiborne Pell,
who was then the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
to criticize the proposed U.S. reservations to the ICCPR and the U.S.
approach to human rights.'6 ° The Committee stated that the RUDs
meant the United States "would not commit itself to do anything that
would require change in present U.S. law or practice."' 161 The letter
further stated that: "[t]he purpose of treaties generally is to undertake
new obligations, in this case to conform U.S. behavior to basic inter-
national standards in human rights. The mere fact that a treaty estab-
lishes standards to which the United States does not currently adhere
is not a reason for a reservation."'162
To understand the difference between a reservation that is re-
quired to protect a constitutional principle and one to which there is
no actual constitutional conflict requires the review of specific exam-
ples. Also, a distinction must be drawn between the unusual situation
where there is a potential or actual conflict between upholding a con-
stitutional right and adhering to a related international norm versus
the far more common situation in which there is merely a difference
between the lower rights protection afforded under U.S. domestic law,
and the more exigent international human rights principles. In this
last instance, there is no conflict between the U.S. and international
standards since the Constitution does not impose ceilings on rights,
but only floors-minimum acceptable levels of rights protections.
Without a background in the history of U.S. opposition to elevat-
ing U.S. rights to match international standards, one might expect that
the United States would never enter RUDs when it encountered an
159. See Ann E. Mayer, Rhetorical Strategies and Official Policies on Women's Rights:
The Merits and Drawbacks of the New World Hypocrisy, in FAITH AND FREEDOM: WO-
MEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 104 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995).
160. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), New York, Statements on U.S.
Ratification of the ICCPR, 14 HUM. RTs L.J. 125 (1993).
161. Id
162. Id. This view does not seem to have been adopted by the U.S. Senate or by the
U.S. State Department.
international norm that offered more expansive protection than was
offered under the U.S. Constitution. However, in a number of in-
stances, the United States has treated lower constitutional standards
as definitive, precluding adherence to the higher international
norms.1 63 When adherence to the Constitution is perfectly compatible
with acceptance of the higher international norm, it is not the need to
uphold constitutional supremacy that compels the United States to re-
ject the higher international norm. The invocation of the Constitution
in such a situation is simply a smoke screen to obscure the political
decisions that prevent persons who would benefit from the higher in-
ternational norms from being able to enjoy enhanced rights. Before
considering this issue, some examples of important U.S. RUDs to
human rights treaties will be reviewed to illustrate how constitutional
obstacles to adopting human rights have been exaggerated.
D. The U.S. Reservation to Article 20 of the ICCPR: A
Constitutional Conflict or a Policy Disagreement?
One of the few instances where many Americans who are sup-
portive of ratifying human rights conventions would agree that follow-
ing international human rights norms clashes with the U.S.
Constitution involves Article 20 of the ICCPR,'I which prohibits
propaganda for war and the advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or vio-
lence. 165 The United States entered a reservation to Article 20, read-
ing the article not to "authorize or require legislation or other action
by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.,166
Plausible constitutional grounds exist for making this reservation.
For example, the First Amendment prohibition against abridgements
of the freedom of speech as interpreted by U.S. courts assumes that
this freedom is an essential underpinning of other rights and precludes
the kinds of curbs on hate speech envisaged in ICCPR Article 20.167
163. See infra notes 179-186 and 347-354 and accompanying text.
164. ICCPR, supra note 3. See, e.g., KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 164-70. See also the
position on U.S. reservations to the ICCPR taken by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, which has been critical of most U.S. RUDs but agreed that the reservation to Arti-
cle 20 was constitutionally required. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note
160, at 125.
165. ICCPR, supra note 3. Hereinafter, for the sake of convenience, the speech prohib-
ited under Article 20 will be referred to as "hate speech."
166. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 126.
167. See KAUFMAN, supra note 101, at 164-69.
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Thus, a "constitutional" reservation could seem necessary to avoid
conflict with the First Amendment. However, one could push the
analysis a step further and ask whether this reservation was actually
compelled by the Constitution or whether this "constitutional" reser-
vation simply shielded political choices that favor freedom of speech
over equality rights behind a constitutional facade.
One motivation behind Article 20 is to curb expressions that have
the proven potential of promoting attitudes and conduct which can be
destructive of rights.168 For example, World War II illustrated how
hate speech could lead to genocide and other hideous crimes. 69 Ob-
viously, the authors of the Bill of Rights, not having lived through the
Nazi atrocities of World War II and being unaware of the impact that
hate speech can have when disseminated via the modem media, could
not have contemplated the threats to rights and freedoms posed by
hate speech in the late twentieth century. In contrast, this was con-
templated by Justice Robert Jackson, who served as a prosecutor at
the Nuremberg Tribunal before returning to the Supreme Court. Af-
ter being directly involved in sorting out the blame for the monstrous
genocide and persecutions carried out by the Nazis, Justice Jackson
stated that he would agree with curbs on freedom of speech if "hateful
and hate-stirring attacks on races and faith" were involved. 7 ° Pro-
tecting such speech, he suggested, "belittles great principles of lib-
erty."'' Justice Jackson did not say that freedom of speech was
undeserving of constitutional protection; he simply noted that in bal-
ancing competing rights, some compromise in First Amendment
speech protection may be necessary to ensure that other rights are not
destroyed. 172 Justice Jackson was prompted to reconsider whether the
line between permitted and prohibited speech had been drawn with
adequate attention to the potential harms of hate speech. Following
this line of thinking and depending upon one's priorities, it is arguable
that the effect of accepting the ICCPR's Article 20 ban on hate speech
is not to diminish rights, but only to curb certain limited kinds of
harmful speech in the interest of protecting other rights. 173
In evaluating whether the ICCPR Article 20 conflicts with the
U.S. Constitution, one should bear in mind that both Article 20 and
168. Id.
169. I& at 165, 167.
170. Elizabeth Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate
Speech, 29 STAN. J. INr'L L. 57, 129 (1992).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id at 128.
the First Amendment are concerned with protecting rights, and when
these two seem to clash, what is actually involved is a decision about
balancing competing rights. Although the Constitution indicates that
Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, it does not
say that this right is absolute and may never be curbed in the interest
of protecting other rights. In fact, various curbs on the freedom of
speech have been upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional. 174
In accepting these curbs, the Supreme Court has necessarily become
embroiled in policy decisions. The U.S. Constitution offers no advice
on how to balance the concern for protecting freedom of speech
against the contemporary concern for ensuring equality and non-dis-
criminatory treatment. 75 The need to effect this balance is quite re-
cent, and the question of whether the curbs on speech mandated by
Article 20 of the ICCPR necessarily conflict with the First Amend-
ment takes one beyond the purview of the text of the Constitution and
the ideas of the Framers and into the realm of current policy disputes.
In judicial decisions interpreting the scope of the First Amend-
ment, the United States has staked out its current position and given
priority to freedom of speech over the equality rights that may suffer
when hate speech remains unrestricted. 76 This position is at odds
with that of other Western democracies, which also value freedom of
speech but have decided that curbs on hate speech are necessary in
the interest of protecting other rights and freedoms. 77 If one accepts
the policies in current U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, one may
conclude that freedom of speech is so important that accepting Article
20 would be ill-advised. However, it is misleading to say that this con-
clusion is expressly compelled by the text of the Constitution or that
Article 20 cannot conceivably be reconciled with any thoughtful read-
ing of the First Amendment. There is an ongoing debate as to
whether First Amendment principles should be interpreted to pre-
clude curbs on hate speech that are designed to protect equality rights
and other freedoms, 78 and the issues in this area are as much political
as they are constitutional in nature.
174. Id. at 126.
175. Defeis, supra note 170, at 128. As Defeis has noted, "a comprehensive theory of
equality did not develop side by side with First Amendment theory." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 128-29.
178. For discussions of the issues being debated in this connection, see, e.g., THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY(Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE PRICE WE PAY]; LEE
C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA (1986); Alan Brownstein, Regulation of Hate Speech at Public Universities:
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The case for there being a real constitutional obstacle to the ac-
ceptance of an international human rights principle is strongest where
Article 20 is implicated. If there were reasons to doubt whether the
U.S. RUDs to Article 20 of the ICCPR were essential to avoid a con-
ffict with the Constitution, the "constitutional" underpinnings for
other RUDs would turn out to be yet more tenuous.
E. The U.S. Reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR
The constitutional basis for the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5)
was nugatory. Article 6(5) barred the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.179 In
making this reservation, the United States used domestic legal stan-
dards, which were approved but not required by constitutional juris-
prudence, to screen out rights provided under international law.
Despite this, the U.S. RUD refers to constitutional constraints:
[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitu-
tional constrains [sic], to impose capital punishment on any per-
son (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital pun-
ishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.' 80
This reservation was exceptional in its forthright wording.'81 The
United States did not pretend that it was compelled to make this res-
ervation to protect rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The sole
constraints on the death penalty that it would recognize were those
imposed by the U.S. Constitution, meaning constraints that were set
forth in Supreme Court decisions. Unlike other, more confusing U.S.
Are First Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?
39 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1991); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected
Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L REv. 287 (1990); Along Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First
Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992); Kenneth L.
Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups,
1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95; Rodney Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions about
Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171 (1990); Jean Stefancic & Richard
Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech Restriction, 78 IowA
L. Rav. 737 (1993); Symposium, Free Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment,
32 WM. & MARY L. RFv. 207 (1991).
179. Defeis, supra note 170, at 126.
180. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 126.
181. Why was the United States unusually frank in this matter? Probably because no
executions in the United States are carried out in secret and executions of juvenile offend-
ers are likely to attract wide notice and international protests. Human rights non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International have shone spotlights on
controversial U.S. death penalty cases for years. This being the case, attempted obfusca-
tion in this area would be futile.
RUDs, this reservation was quickly perceived as a square rejection of
international law in favor of adherence to a retrograde norm of do-
mestic law, provoking criticism from human rights advocates and the
international community.
F. Judicial Parochialism Regarding Rights: The Death Penalty Cases
Relevant Supreme Court decisions show that some Justices are
dismissive of international rights principles.'"' Well before the 1992
ratification of the ICCPR, the Supreme Court had interpreted the
Eighth Amendment in Stanford v. Kentucky, 83 to allow the imposi-
tion of the death penalty for persons convicted under state law for
crimes committed when they were below eighteen years of age.184 In
a divided decision, the majority dismissed the relevance of interna-
tional human rights law regarding the death penalty. 8 5 In ruling that
the Kentucky law allowing the death penalty to be imposed on juve-
nile offenders did not violate the Constitution, the Court majority did
not look beyond the confines of the Constitution and the Anglo-
American common law tradition, as noted in the dissent. 86
Of course, such a ruling did not mean that state laws barring the
execution of juveniles-thereby affording them more protection than
the Constitution required-were in violation of the Constitution.
Similarly, the ICCPR Article 6(5) provision barring the execution of
juvenile offenders does not contravene any provision of the U.S. Con-
stitution. What was actually being served by the U.S. reservation to
Article 6(5) was a policy of upholding U.S. domestic law and associ-
ated values in the face of international norms to the contrary. Thus, in
making its reservation, the United States had no need whatsoever to
refer to the Constitution. Perhaps the hope was that a constitutional
reference would lend more dignity to the U.S. position.
The mentality informing the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) has a
counterpart in the parochial legal vision of Justice Antonin Scalia, the
author of the majority opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky.'" 7 In the deci-
sion, Justice Scalia wrote as if respect for customary international law
should not figure into constitutional adjudication, and the only con-
cern should be whether the death penalty offended U.S. standards of
182. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
183. 1&
184. Id.
185. Id. at 377.
186. I& at 389-90.
187. Id. at 361.
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decency.18 8 He effectively announced to the world his indifference to
whether his constitutional rulings flouted the norms of international
law. In contrast, the dissent urged that both international treaties like
the ICCPR (which the United States had not yet ratified as of this
ruling) and relevant legislation in other countries, should be taken
into account in deciding whether imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders violated contemporary standards of decency.18 9
Justice Scalia's dismissive attitude towards international law and
international opinion was presaged by his dissent in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 90 where the majority held that imposing the death penalty
on fifteen-year-old offenders was unconstitutional. 9' This plurality
opinion written by the liberal Justice Stevens gave weight to interna-
tional human rights standards and legislation of other countries, treat-
ing these as relevant to the Court's determination. 92 In dissent,
Justice Scalia forcefully contended that the only values that mattered
in deciding whether the death penalty was unconstitutional were do-
mestic ones. 193 Being disposed to follow an originalism that inelucta-
bly draws him back towards the eighteenth century and British legal
tradition, Justice Scalia included in his "domestic values" several as-
pects of Anglo-Saxon common law, citing Blackstone's 1789 Com-
mentaries, which discusses capital punishment of 15-year-old
criminals.194 Justice Scalia dismissed the idea that the Court could
learn from the contemporary community of nations or from the views
of human rights organizations:
The plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account
of what it pronounces to be civilized standards of decency in
other countries... is totally inappropriate as a means of estab-
lishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation. That 40% of our
States do not rule out capital punishment for 15-year-old felons
is determinative of the question before us here, even if that posi-
tion contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding .... Where there is not first
a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may
188. Id. at 361-88.
189. Id at 389-90.
190. 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 830-31.
193. d. at 877-78.
194. Id. at 864.
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think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution. 195
Thus, Justice Scalia views the Constitution as a bulwark against
international human rights law and other foreign influences where the
sole impact of following international standards would be to raise U.S.
standards. Scalia rejected the idea that U.S. constitutional jurispru-
dence could be judged deficient by the measure of international
human rights standards or that it could be enriched and improved by
reviewing international human rights perspectives. Given the ascen-
dancy of the insular perspectives of Justice Scalia and his like-minded
allies on the Supreme Court, reliance on domestic constitutional stan-
dards will tend to cause U.S. rights to drift further away from modem
international norms.
G. Reactions to the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR
Perhaps the post-World War II pre-eminence of the United States
and a reluctance to take on such a potent adversary accounts for the
limited number of states that have so far registered official objections
to the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR. Objections to the U.S. reservation
to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR were made by only eleven states-
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 9 6 However, the United States
appeared indifferent to the criticisms of these countries. Sweden dip-
lomatically implied that the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR gave Sweden
cause to doubt the good faith of the U.S. ratification:
A reservation by which a State modifies or excludes the applica-
tion of the most fundamental provisions of the Covenant, or lim-
its its responsibilities under that treaty by invoking general
principles of national law, may cast doubts upon the commit-
ment of the reserving State to the object and purpose of the
Covenant.... [T]he reservations made by the United States of
America include both reservations to essential and non-dero-
gable provisions, and general references to national legislation.
Reservations of this nature contribute to undermining the basis
of international treaty law.197
During meetings on March 29 and 31, 1995, to review the reports
submitted by parties to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee ex-
pressed its regrets over the extent of the U.S. RUDs, believing that
"taken together, they intended to ensure that the United States has
195. IM. at 868-69 n.4.
196. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 127-30.
197. I& at 129-30.
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accepted what is already the law of the United States."'198 That is, the
committee perceived that in ratifying the ICCPR the United States
was only promising to uphold U.S. domestic law-not to go one inch
beyond it in an attempt to meet international standards. The commit-
tee expressed particular concern over the reservations to Article
6(5)-the ban on the death penalty for juvenile offenders-and Arti-
cle 7-the ban on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 199 The
Committee expert from Cyprus seemed dissatisfied with the focus of
the U.S. report to the Human Rights Committee, which in his view
should have been on the "consonance" of U.S. human rights with the
Covenant and the RUDs.2°° He also questioned why the United
States should deprive its citizens of protection under the Covenant.201
Thus, some expert observers were beginning to recognize that certain
U.S. RUDs were incompatible with adherence to international human
rights conventions and that the United States was denying its citizens
rights guaranteed under international human rights law.
That U.S. law was falling behind advances in international human
rights was not acknowledged in the U.S. report to the Human Rights
Committee.20 2 In a passage in the report that could be seen either as a
sign of chauvinistic naivete or calculated disingenuousness, the United
States vaunted the strength of its constitutionally-based scheme of
rights and portrayed the problem as being very different from the one
seen by its critics. From the U.S. report, one might gather that the
problem was that the ICCPR standards were lower than the strong
rights guarantees provided in the U.S. Constitution, and that the
ICCPR threatened to restrict fundamental human rights unless the
principle of constitutional supremacy was upheld. The report claimed:
198. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1413d mtg. at 3 [International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 40 of the Covenant. Comments of the Human Rights Committee.] U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995) [hereinafter ICCPR Reports].
199. Id. The United States had reserved to the Article 7 ban on cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, saying that it would be interpreted according to U.S. constitutional
requirements. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 126.
200. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1402d mtg. at 7 [Press Release: Human
Rights Committee Continues Consideration of United States' Initial Report]. U.N. DOC.
HR/CT/401 (March 29, 1995) [hereinafter Press Release: Human Rights Committee March
29 Mtg.].
201. Id.
202. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., [International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Cov-
enant. Initial Reports of States parties due in 1993. Addendum. United States of
America.] U.N. Doc. CCPR/CI81/Add.4 (1994) [hereinafter ICCPR Initial Reports].
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The United States was founded on basic principles of human
rights from which it cannot deviate. In particular, the rights
guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, which substantially reflect
the principles embodied in the Covenant, are the supreme law
of the land. These guarantees represent a foundation that can
never be broken.... In some instances, that foundation already
provides greater protection than the Covenant. Therefore, the
United States could never restrict fundamental human rights on
the pretext that the Covenant does not recognize such rights or
recognizes them to a lesser extent.20 3
Although the United States had expressed the view "that the pro-
visions of the Covenant were fully represented in U.S. law,"204 this
was not, the German expert noted, a view universally held even within
the United States.20 5 The German expert perceptively observed that
both the U.S. report and the U.S. delegation's answers represented a
"Constitution-centric" view,20 6 a polite way of describing the U.S.
stance that its Constitution was the touchstone of legitimacy for all
other laws. For people from countries where there was no tradition of
constitution-worship, the "Constitution-centric" U.S. perspective and
the smug complacency about inferior U.S. domestic rights standards
were doubtless a source of some puzzlement.
V. Women's Rights in U.S. Law
A. The Failure to Guarantee Women's Equality
The United States unwillingness to ratify treaties that would guar-
antee equal rights for women without the inclusion of RUDs has set
back U.S. women's chances to obtain equality. U.S. domestic law on
women's rights is deficient by modem international standards, and
U.S. women are still obliged to fight for a guarantee of equality with
men. Having declined to heed Abigail Adams's 1776 admonition to
remember the ladies,20 7 the Founding Fathers wrote a Constitution
from which women are completely absent. Even as amended subse-
quently, it provides no explicit guarantee of any rights for women ex-
cept in the Nineteenth Amendment, which prohibits the use of sex to
203. Ie at 35-36.
204. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg. at 6 [Press Release: Human
Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Initial Report of United States]. U.N. Doc.
HR/CT/405 (March 31, 1995) [hereinafter Press Release: Human Rights Committee March
31 Mtg.].
205. Id.
206. Id
207. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 129.
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deny the right to vote.2°8 As one critic has argued, basic features of
the Bill of Rights, as interpreted, may either fail to address problems
facing women, or actually serve the interests of women's rights oppo-
nents. 20 9 The private-public split affecting U.S. rights protections, and
the pattern of affording negative rights rather than affirmative entitle-
ments, mean that economic and educational rights protections that are
vital to women remain outside the sphere of government responsibil-
ity, making women's disadvantages seem "natural" and pre-polit-
ical.2 10 As will be argued below, the equal protection standard that
U.S. women are forced to rely on, faute de mieux, is distinctly inferior
to the international norm of women's equality. When compared with
the protections for women's rights that are afforded in typical modern
constitutions, which contain strong affirmations of women's equality,
the deficiencies in U.S. protection for the rights of women become
obvious. 1
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
209. See generally Becker, supra note 71. For example, the First Amendment has been
interpreted to allow substantial government subsidies and tax and postage breaks for patri-
archal religious organizations, which socialize children in ways that lead them to accept
patriarchy as healthy. See id. at 479-81.
210. Id. at 456.
211. For example, the 1946 French Constitution in its preamble, "guarantees to the wo-
man, in all domains, equal rights to the man." FR. CONST. pmbl. The current 1958 French
constitution confirms this commitment. FR. CONST. pmbl.
Additionally, the 1949 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that:
(1) all people are equal before the law, (2) men and women have equal rights, and (3)
nobody shall be prejudiced or favored because of their sex, birth, race, language, social
origin, faith, religion or political opinions. F.R.G. CONsT. art. 3, reprinted in CONSTrTU-
TIONS, supra note 92.
Also, the 1979 Spanish Constitution provides that: "Spaniards are equal before the
law, without any discrimination for reasons of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any
other personal or social condition or circumstance." SPAIN CONST. art. 14, reprinted in id.
The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "[e]very individual
is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
CAN. CONsT. art. 15, reprinted in id.
The 1987 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands provides that "[a]ll persons
in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances," and that
"[d]iscrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex on any
other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted." NETH. CONST. art. 1, reprinted in id.
The 1992 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic pro-
vides that "[flundamental human rights and freedoms are guaranteed to everybody with-
out distinction to gender, race, color, language, belief, religion, political or other
persuasion, national or social origin, membership in a national or ethnic minority, prop-
erty, birth, or other status." CZECH CONST. (Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms) art. 3, reprinted in id.
B. The Significance of the Defeat of the ERA
The U.S. Constitution lacks a guarantee of equal rights for wo-
men not because such a guarantee has never been contemplated, but
because attempts to amend the Constitution to include such a guaran-
tee have been repeatedly thwarted. In 1848, at the first Women's
Rights Convention, the Declaration of Sentiments was formulated and
issued by suffragists like Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton
and their allies.2"2 In the nineteenth century, women who were fight-
ing for equality and the right to vote tried unsuccessfully to remove
the words "men" and "male" from section 2 of the proposed Four-
teenth Amendment and also to rework the proposed Fifteenth
Amendment to include sex as a category protected against discrimina-
tion.21 3 Since the 1920s there have been repeated calls for adopting an
Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would ex-
One cannot canvass the constitutional rights protections of the U.K., because the U.K.
still lacks a written constitution. It is, however, bound by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms of 1950, which guarantees that "[tjhe enjoy-
ment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without dis-
crimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Article 14 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that "(1) Every per-
son shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law," and
"(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without
derogating from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds
in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disa-
bility, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language." S. AR. CONST. art. 8, reprinted in
CONSrrnM=IONS, supra note 92.
Finally, the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation provides that "(1) All people
shall be equal before the law and in the court of law, (2) The State shall guarantee the
equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, prop-
erty or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership of pub-
lic associations or any other circumstances. Any restrictions of the rights of citizens on
social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be forbidden," and "(3) Men
and women shall have equal rights and liberties and equal opportunities for their pursuit."
Russ. CONsT. art. 19, reprinted in id,
212. The declaration decried the "absolute tyranny" that men exercised over women.
Reprinted in JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INiusncE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF UNiTED
STATES WOMEN 383-87 (1991).
213. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 131. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1283 n.12 (1991) [hereinafter Reflections
on Sex Equality]. Some who considered that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment might
apply to women appeared to hope that its potential to afford rights to women would make
the Fourteenth Amendment unpopular and could be used to defeat it. Id. In the same
manner, it seems that some Southern conservatives opposed to civil rights for Black Amer-
icans hoped that, by adding sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, they could ensure its failure.
See infra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
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pressly guarantee women's equality. In 1923 Alice Paul, a prominent
feminist leader, drafted such an amendment with language that was
notable for its positive phrasing: "Men and women shall have equal
rights throughout the United States and in every place subject to its
jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.1214 Proposals for an ERA also were seriously
considered in 1946, 1950, 1953, and 1970.215 The reasons why an ERA
was thought necessary to secure U.S. women's rights have been care-
fully explained by legal scholars.216 It was projected that under an
ERA, gender would not be a permissible factor in determining legal
rights except where a physical characteristic unique to one sex was
involved.217 President Kennedy favored the adoption of an ERA,21 8
and, had he lived longer, the prospects for eventual ratification of an
ERA might have been considerably brighter. Finally, a proposed
ERA was submitted for ratification by the states in 1972.219
Finding the prospect of eliminating sex-based distinctions appal-
ling, conservative groups mobilized around the country to fight the
ERA.220 Among other things, the ERA was portrayed as anti-family
and threatening to morality and traditional values.22' Stereotypes of
men as the natural providers and women as dependents were
deployed to discredit the notion that equal rights for women were
desirable.222
214. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 140. MacKinnon has lamented the subsequent shift
in language from this affirmative statement to the later wordings, which involved a nega-
tively-worded ban on discrimination by the government. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Un-
thinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 759, 770 (1987) (book review). It is
noteworthy that the new Equal Rights Amendment being promoted by NOW has an af-
firmative wording. See Ellen O'Brien, Resurrecting the Equal Rights Amendment, PHiLA-
DELPHIA INQUIRER, July 30, 1995, at L1. The first paragraph of the new draft provides:
"All persons shall have equal rights and privileges without discrimination on account of
sex, race, sexual orientation, marital status, ethnicity, national origin, color, indigence, age
or disability." Id at L2.
215. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 886 (1971).
216. See, eg., id. at 884-85, 890-93.
217. Id. at 893.
218. See Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition
of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. SOUTHERN Hisr. 37, 40
(1983).
219. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHiY WE LOST THE ERA 12 (1986).
220. Id at 13.
221. See RENEE FEINBERG, THE EQuAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. AN ANNOTATED BIBLI-
OGRAPHY OF THE IssuEs 1976-1985 17 (1986).
222. See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cul-
tural Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731, 1746 (1991) [hereinafter The "No Problem" Problem].
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Legal scholar Deborah Rhode has noted how the opponents of
the ERA drew on the support of Fundamentalist and Catholic constit-
uencies that viewed women's equality as barred by the Bible.2 3 Not
only did there prove to be a strong correlation between church mem-
bership and attendance and opposition to the ERA, but religion
seems to have been a factor in converting people who originally sup-
ported the ERA to taking opposing stances. 24  Opponents of wo-
men's rights have discovered that religious ideologies afford one of
the few effective weapons that they can deploy against women's
rights; the rise of well-funded and energetic religiously-oriented orga-
nizations opposed to women's rights continues to be a factor in keep-
ing the United States from adopting more mainstream ideas about
women's rights.
Republicans like Ronald Reagan, who wanted to court the sup-
port of the religious right, found it expedient to condemn the ERA.2' s
Thus, Reagan, who had originally supported the ERA, shifted posi-
tions after winning the Presidency in 1980.226 President Reagan used
his bully pulpit to excoriate the ERA as an abomination and a menace
to morals.22 7
With conservative forces and religious groups fully committed to
the campaign against the ERA, it was finally defeated in 1982.3
Catharine MacKinnon notes the quiescence of U.S. women as the
ERA was killed and contrasts it with the rebellion of Canadian wo-
men when they found out that the proposed Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms was not to contain firm guarantees of equality
for women.22 9 She suggests that the passive reaction of American wo-
men may have been due to their being too submerged in the problems
of sexism even to notice the loss of a possible solution. 3 0 Women
may also have been lulled into complacency by the prevailing assump-
223. l
224. Becker, supra note 71, at 475-76 & n.108.
225. See RONNME DUGGER, ON REAGAN: THE MAN & His PRESIDENCY 234-35 (1983).
226. IaL
227. President Reagan expressed many objections to the ERA. These included his an-
ticipation that after it was adopted one could see "sex and sexual differences treated as
casually and amorally as dogs and other beasts treat them"; that women would have to
share restrooms, barracks, and shower rooms with men; and that it would override essen-
tial statutes such as those based on the physical abilities of men and women. Id.
228. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 219, at 13. For analyses of the reasons for the defeat,
see id.; MARY FRANCES BERRY, WmY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND
THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986). See also the critique of Man-
sbridge by Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, supra note 214.
229. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, supra note 214, at 759-60.
230. Id. at 770-71.
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tions about the adequacy of rights protections that were already af-
forded by U.S. law, including the expanded reach of the Equal
Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even women who
favored the ERA may have wrongly assumed that an ERA was no
longer essential to secure women's equality.
C. Women's Rights in Default of an ERA
Of course, if one is decrying the failure of the U.S. to give women
a constitutional guarantee of equality, one should not be understood
to be denying that real progress has been made over the last decades
in enhancing women's rights. Legislation at the state and national
levels and court rulings have contributed to gains women have
made. 31 It is also true that U.S. women, along with others in the U.S.,
enjoy a high standard of protection for many civil and political rights.
In this context, it is ultimately the incongruity of the refusal to guaran-
tee women one of the most basic civil and political rights, equality,
that becomes intriguing.
In the absence of any express constitutional guarantee of equality
for women, United States courts since 1971 have found certain protec-
tions for women's rights in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.231 The Supreme Court's sudden "discovery" that
the Equal Protection Clause extended to sex discrimination may have
been stimulated by political developments in that era, including the
expansion of women's rights that resulted from the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and ongoing debates about the proposed ERA.
The Equal Protection Clause is a problematic substitute for an
ERA, providing no secure basis for assuring women's equality. One
should recall that the Equal Protection Clause does not mention wo-
men's rights and that historically it was never intended to offer protec-
tions for women, having been formulated to secure the rights of Black
American males in the southern states after the Civil War. In 1872,
when the reach of the Equal Protection Clause was restricted to its
original constituency, Myra Colby Bradwell, a woman mounting a
constitutional challenge to an Illinois rule preventing women from be-
coming lawyers, did not seek relief under the Equal Protection
231. See generally HoiF, supra note 212, at 229-316.
232. The crucial turning point came in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which used an
expanded interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate an Idaho statute that
favored males over females in appointing executors of decedents' estates.
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Clause. 23  Bradwell sued instead under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-only to be thwarted.23 4
In deciding the Bradwell case, the Supreme Court consulted
Blackstone for guidance, as Justice Scalia would in Thompson v.
Oklahoma one hundred and fourteen years later.23 5 In rejecting
Bradwell's claim, members of the Court relied on sex stereotyping. hI
a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley admonished that man was wo-
man's "protector and defender," that nature had destined men and
women for different spheres, and that "[t]he natural and proper timid-
ity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life."'236 Today this sexist language is
sometimes cited as quaint; in reality, remnants of sex stereotyping
continue to influence judicial decisions on a woman's right to attend a
previously all-male military academy. 3 7 That is, the basic judicial atti-
tudes in the Bradwell decision proved more durable than the specific
conclusion that women should not be allowed to work as lawyers.
Although judges currently read the Equal Protection Clause to
include women rather than according to its original intent, nothing in
the Constitution as it now stands compels judges to accord rights other
than the franchise to women. However, fashions in constitutional in-
terpretation are subject to change. Should conservative forces again
obtain control over both the Senate and the Presidency, they could
succeed in packing the federal courts with more of their ideological
allies. These judges could reinstate the pre-1971 precedents and rule
that the Equal Protection Clause has been wrongly extended to sup-
port challenges to sex-based discrimination.
The process by which women's rights were belatedly read into the
Fourteenth Amendment has a counterpart in the strange twist that led
to the inclusion of sex in the wording of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.238 In its final version, this statute constituted the most
significant progress for women's rights since the adoption of the Nine-
teenth Amendment in 1920. However, like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Civil Rights Act as originally proposed was intended to
remedy racial discrimination, not to provide a remedy for sex
discrimination.
233. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
234. Id at 138-39.
235. 487 U.S. 815, 864 (1988). See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
236. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
237. See discussion infra part V.E.
238. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex,
among other categories).
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The Civil Rights Act was bitterly opposed by conservatives in
Congress. In the past, southerners had resorted to amendments to
thwart proposed civil rights legislation,239 and this approach was tried
again with regard to Title VII. Howard Worth Smith of Virginia, one
of the ardent opponents of the Civil Rights Act in the House, pro-
posed to insert wording that would extend coverage to women.2 °
Smith's comments in presenting the changed wording to Congress
provoked amusement.24 1 Smith's motives have been debated and may
have been mixed. There is evidence suggesting that Smith intended
the new language including sex as a joke and also as a means of fight-
ing the passage of the Civil Rights Act, but other evidence suggests
that Smith believed that chivalry required adding language to prevent
White women from being placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Blacks. 242
With the addition of the word "sex" to the Civil Rights Act,
southerners who had opposed the legislation as a whole became will-
ing to support it,243 perhaps for motives as mixed as Smith's. Con-
versely, Representative Edith Green, a supporter of women's rights,
opposed the amended version of the Civil Rights Act because of her
awareness that the category of sex had been added not to help wo-
men, but to prevent passage of the legislation.2 "4
This eleventh hour modification to the Title VII text has provided
the basis for vast improvement in employment opportunities for wo-
men.245 However, rights that ultimately rest on a Congressman pok-
ing fun at the premises of the Civil Rights Act and subsequent devious
political maneuvering by a phalanx of southern senators unsympa-
thetic to civil rights are hardly as securely protected as rights that re-
sult from a genuine political commitment on the part of Congress. As
Catharine MacKinnon has observed, "[t]hus has the legal entitlement
to sex equality, tenuous and limited when there at all, ranged from
anathema to afterthought." 246
Among the consequences of the inclusion of sex only when the
vote on the Civil Rights Act was imminent is the absence of legislative
history to support the idea that Congress wanted to see an end to all
239. Brauer, supra note 218, at 46.
240. Id. at 44.
241. Id. at 48-49.
242. Id at 44-45, 49-59.
243. Id at 56.
244. LEo KANOWrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 105
(1969).
245. See id. at 106.
246. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 213, at 1284.
practices that discriminated against women. This has led the Supreme
Court to observe that "the legislative history of Title VII's prohibition
of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity. 247 Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the last-minute addition of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibition meant that "we are left with little legislative history to
guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination
based on 'sex.""'2  For this reason, judges who are ill-disposed to-
ward allowing women to challenge sex discrimination have more lee-
way in interpreting Title VII than they would if the legislative history
was lengthier and less ambiguous in indicating how determined Con-
gress was to see all barriers to women's equality dismantled.
D. Protections for Women's Rights Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Deficiencies of the Intermediate
Scrutiny Standard
Since Title VII only protects women from employment discrimi-
nation,2 49 women must resort to Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence to challenge sex discrimination in other areas. Since expanding
the Equal Protection Clause to cover sex, the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively established a hierarchy of equality claims, demarcating three
separate tiers of scrutiny to apply to different categories of discrimina-
tion. °50 The most exigent tier is for race discrimination, and plaintiffs
seeking to overturn racially discriminatory classifications have a rela-
tively easy time proving that these are unconstitutional.35' In contrast,
plaintiffs" challenging classifications that result in sex-based discrimina-
tion must meet a heavier burden, since classifications based on sex
need only withstand intermediate or "middle-tier" scrutiny. 2 Such
classifications can be justified by showing that they are substantially
related to achieving an important government interest."3 Members of
the Supreme Court have disagreed about whether the treatment of
247. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976).
248. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
250. See HALBERSTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111, at 39.
251. Md. According to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, racial classifications are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and can only be justified by showing of a compelling governmental
interest. As has been noted, "[flor all practical purposes, this compelling state interest is
never found to be present by the Court," which means that racial discrimination will al-
ways be deemed unconstitutional. Id.
252. IM. at 44. The third tier in the court's analysis merely requires a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate government objective to justify discrimination, id. at 39, but it is not
relevant for the issues in this Article.
253. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) and the related discussion of the
VMI and Citadel cases, infra part V.E.
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sex discrimination should be more lenient than racial discrimination,
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Justice Brennan representing
opposite poles in this debate.254 The Supreme Court's middle-tier
scrutiny of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause has
been criticized in a comparative study of U.S. law and CEDAW for its
lack of clearly articulated standards.255 Interestingly, Senate support-
ers of the 1972 ERA had proposed that men and women be treated
the same except where compelling social interests existed such as pro-
tecting the right of privacy and the need to recognize objective physi-
cal differences between the sexes.25 6 That is, Americans who
supported equality for women thought that strict scrutiny should be
used in sex discrimination cases.
Under the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny standard, sex dis-
crimination in state-sponsored military academies has survived consti-
tutional challenges that would have been fatal under strict scrutiny2 57
Several rulings that illustrate the intermediate scrutiny test and shed
light on the significance of U.S. RUDs to the international norm of
equality of the sexes will be briefly reviewed.
In the United States, the determination of what is or is not "con-
stitutional" treatment of women proves to be responsive to political
vagaries. For example, judicial attitudes changed when Reagan as-
sumed the presidency in 1980 and the political winds shifted. In ac-
cordance with Reagan's attacks on the ERA, the Carter
Administration policy of opening up the military to women was scut-
tled. Instead, a policy was adopted of reducing women's role in the
military, segregating them in training, and excluding them from
combat.258
Swaying to the right after the election of Reagan, the Court
showed that it was prepared to change course under the guise of con-
stitutional interpretation when challenges to sex discrimination were
made. This new policy was quickly endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Rostker v. Goldberg,259 a decision authored by Justice Rehnquist. Jus-
tice Rehnquist had previously dissented from decisions subjecting sex
254. See Lance Koonce, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and the Fate of the Peremp-
tory Challenge, 73 N.C. L. REv. 525, 529 n.45, 548-49 (1995).
255. HALBERSTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111, at 44.
256. Brown, supra note 215, at 887.
257. See infra part V.E.
258. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 578 (1991) [hereinafter The Pursuit of Manhood].
259. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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discrimination to heightened judicial scrutiny,26 ° and in Rostker, he
upheld the military's policy of requiring men but not women to regis-
ter for the draft.261 Legislation like the women's exemption from
draft registration reviewed in Rostker, which ostensibly protected wo-
men, had previously been perceived by the Court as unacceptable for
"reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women. 262
The views of Justice Rehnquist, who became Chief Justice in
1986, regarding sex discrimination deserve consideration. According
to his thinking, the military draft was designed to produce combat
troops, but women were not eligible for combat positions.263 There-
fore, as potential draftees, women were not similarly situated vis-a-vis
men,264 and they were accordingly not entitled to equal treatment
with men who were eligible for combat.265 Thus, excluding women
from the requirement to register for the draft was not unconstitu-
tional, because women were also excluded from combat. Justice
Rehnquist reached the conclusion that women could be constitution-
ally excluded from the draft despite the fact that President Carter's
call for women to be included in the draft had been supported by mili-
tary officials.266 Ignoring the counsel of military experts, he took the
position that the Court should defer to Congress in military mat-
ters.267 Since there was little reason to defer to Congress on a ques-
tion like women's qualifications for the draft, one could speculate that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's own conservative views and sex stereotyping
may have prompted him to search for ways of confirming his view that
women should be excluded from the draft, thus leading him to adopt
the congressional position. The decision in Rostker has been vigor-
ously condemned by legal scholars for its use of "one governmentally
created inequality to justify another, and for exemplifying the influ-
260. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood, supra note 258, at 578 n.290.
261. 453 U.S. at 83.
262. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
263. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76.
264. Id. at 78.
265. Id at 78-79.
266. Id. at 79; see also id. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 64-65. Congress had opposed drafting women, but had not researched the
merits of excluding women from the draft. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984
DUKE L.J. 447,451 [hereinafter Woman's Constitution]. Instead, it merely relied on stereo-
types about women's proper role. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflec-
tions on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's R-s. L. REP. 175, 185 (1982).
Congress had shown sensitivity to expressions of distaste by constituents who were upset at
the notion of women entering "this 'man's world'." Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood, supra
note 258, at 578 n.290.
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ence of sex-role stereotyping on judicial thinking. '268 This ruling has
been described as "part of a larger political order that serves to
subordinate women to men's uses. "269
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on sex stereotyping in Rostker was
not a one-time aberration. Michael M. v. Superior Court27 ° dealt with
the constitutionality of a California law penalizing a man for having
sex with a woman under eighteen, but not penalizing a woman who
had sex with a man under eighteen.2 71 In writing the opinion of the
plurality, Justice Rehnquist again displayed his stereotypical assump-
tions about sex differences, which have been highlighted by Sylvia
Law in a deft analysis.272 The Court, according to Law, was predis-
posed to accept classifications that it believed reflected biological dif-
ferences, and it only formally applied the intermediate scrutiny test.273
Rehnquist was unable to persuade the Court to uphold discrimi-
nation based on sex stereotyping in an important and closely-related
1982 case. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,274 the
newly-appointed Justice Sandra Day O'Connor led the Court away
from Justice Rehnquist's sex stereotyping. In ruling that male stu-
dents were being unconstitutionally excluded from a state-sponsored
nursing school, Justice O'Connor relied on precedents that provided a
legal basis to challenge laws that aimed to "protect" women via the
use of "archaic and stereotypic" generalizations about men and wo-
men.275 Justice O'Connor held that MUW's policy was illegitimate
because it made "the assumption that nursing is a field for women a
self-fulfilling prophecy."276
E. The Survival of Sex Stereotyping: The VMI and Citadel Cases
When sex discrimination linked to sex stereotyping passed consti-
tutional muster in the Fourth Circuit decision in United States v. Vir-
268. See, ag., Karst, Woman's Constitution, supra note 267, at 450.
269. Id- at 451.
270. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
271. Id. at 466.
272. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 999-
1001 (1984).
273. See id. at 1001. Law argues that, although in theory bound to follow the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test, the Court in evaluating discriminatory laws "may become much more
deferential when the Court perceives that a rule is based on 'real' differences between the
sexes." Id. at 1005.
274. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
275. Id. at 725-26 & nn.10-12.
276. Id. at 730. The MUW charter exuded sex stereotyping, saying that the school
aimed to instruct "girls" in occupations like stenography and needlework. Id. at 720 n.1.
ginia, ' 77 the unpredictability of case outcomes under the middle-tier
standard of the Fourteenth Amendment was illustrated. In that case,
an equal protection challenge was brought against the policy of ex-
cluding women students from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a
state-sponsored institution.2 78 The court accepted that Virginia had
an important governmental interest in having the educational diver-
sity that single sex institutions allowed,2 79 and it appeared persuaded
that there were valid pedagogical reasons for keeping VMI all male.280
The court seemed to accept VMI's protests that admitting women
would be destructive of its unique program and to agree that there
were sound reasons for single-sex schools.281 The court stressed that:
"Men and women are different, and our knowledge about the differ-
ences, physiological and psychological, is becoming increasingly more
sophisticated. Indeed the evidence in this case amply demonstrated
that single-genderedness in education can be pedagogicallyjustifiable."' 2
VMI's adversative style of education-which involved physical
and mental adversity, stress, deprivation of privacy, and minute regu-
lation of behavior-was deemed to be effective for men but inappro-
priate for women. 3 The court therefore anticipated that, if women
were admitted, this would require adjustments that would fundamen-
tally change VMI and preclude it from using its unique educational
method.28
Despite its sympathy for VMI's rationale for excluding women,
the court found that the existence of a state-sponsored all-male insti-
tution when there was no comparable all-female institution failed to
serve the goal of providing diverse styles of education.285 The court
held that unless Virginia would establish a comparable program for
women in another school, VMI would have to admit women or forego
its state support and become private.8 6
In a later ruling in U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia,'87 the
Fourth Circuit approved VMI's proposal to establish an alternate pro-
277. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
278. Id. at 892.
279. See id at 898-99.
280. Id. at 897-98.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 897.
283. Id. at 893.
284. Id. at 897-98.
285. Id. at 898-99.
286. Id. at 899.
287. 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
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gram for women.28  The Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL) at Mary Baldwin College, an all-women liberal arts college,
was ruled an acceptable substitute.289 Sex stereotypes were used in
setting up the Mary Baldwin College Program as the women's alterna-
tive to the VMI program. It was deliberately designed to be a less
rigorous program that would eschew the "adversative" elements of
the VMI system.290 This was regarded as a needed adjustment, be-
cause it was assumed that women would need a supportive environ-
ment.2 91 This 1995 decision was in effect using the same sex
stereotypes about the "natural and proper timidity and delicacy" of
females that Myra Bradwell had encountered when she sought admis-
sion to the bar over a century earlier.
The sex stereotypes employed in upholding the Mary Baldwin
program are pernicious for women's rights. As Sylvia Law has re-
marked: "There is a great danger that affording legal respect to pre-
sumed sex-based differences will perpetuate those differences.
Furthermore, general rules premised on assumptions of universal sex-
based difference are unjust in relation to the individual men and wo-
men who do not fit the presumed norm. '' 2 2 One did not need to wait
until Rebecca Marier graduated in June 1995 at the top of her West
Point class-ranking first in the military, academic, and physical pro-
grams293-to have proof that women did not necessarily require a
watered-down curriculum to excel.
Based on the reasoning of Sweatt v. Painter,294 the VWIL alterna-
tive would have failed if that separate facility were racially segregated
and lacked equivalent intangibles, such as "reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions and prestige. '295 In the VMI
case, the doctrine of "separate but equal" was accepted even though it
288. Id. at 1241.
289. Id. at 1234.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Law, supra note 272, at 968. She advocates a vision of equality in which the law
would "respect each persons's authority to define herself or himself, free from sex-defined
legal constraints," rather than enforcing a general vision of what men and women are "re-
ally" like. Id.
293. First Woman is Top Graduate at West Point, PHmA. INQUIRER, June 3, 1995, at
A12.
294. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
295. Id. at 634. For comparisons of the treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of
schools segregated by race and those segregated by sex, see Note, Revisiting Plessy at the
Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U.
Prr. L. REv. 637 (1993).
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was clear that Mary Baldwin was not equal to VMI in terms of vital
intangibles. As the dissent noted in reviewing the disparities between
the VMI and VWIL programs:
If every good thing projected for the VWIL program is realized
in reasonably foreseeable time, it will necessarily be then but a
pale shadow of VMI in terms of the great bulk, if not all of those
criteria. Particularly is this obvious with respect to the in-
tangibles such as prestige, tradition and alumni influence which
the Supreme Court, looking for substantial equality of educa-
tional opportunities in Sweatt, thought "more important" even
than tangible resources. ... The student and eventual graduate
of VWIL will not be able to call on the prestigious name of
"VMI" in seeking employment or preference in her various en-
deavors; the powerful political and economic ties of the VMI
alumni network cannot be expected to open for her; the prestige
and tradition of her own fledgling institution cannot possibly
ever achieve even rough parity with those of VMI. The catch-up
game is an impossible one, as any honest reflection upon the
matter must reveal.2 96
The court's refusal to rehear the VMI case provoked a dissent by
Judge Diana Gribbon Motz. 297 Noting the disparity that "separate but
equal" treatment for Blacks was unconstitutional but separate and
"concededly not even equal" treatment for women was constitu-
tional,298 Judge Motz stressed that the VMI case could never with-
stand the strict scrutiny test.299 Even under the intermediate scrutiny
standard, she found implausible VMI's assertions that sex-segregation
and its "adversative" method were essential to its mission of produc-
ing citizen soldiers when co-educational U.S. military academies were
producing citizen soldiers without resorting to VMI's type of "adver-
sative" training.300 Furthermore, since the VWIL lacked "adversa-
tive" training, it could not be "substantially comparable" to the
VMI.30 1 Judge Motz lambasted the concession by the majority that
the VWIL degree "lacks the historical benefit and prestige of a degree
from VMI" as "almost epic understatement."302
296. U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Philips, J.,
dissenting.) The majority conceded this point but said that the proposed VWIL would
nonetheless offer opportunities for women that were "sufficiently comparable." Ld. at
1241.
297. U.S. v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995).
298. Id
299. I& at 92.
300. Id. at *6.
301. Id. at 93.
302. Id
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A similar issue was raised in Faulkner v. Jones,30 3 in which Shan-
non Faulkner claimed that she had been unconstitutionally denied ad-
mission to the Citadel, an all-male military academy sponsored by the
State of South Carolina.3° The Fourth Circuit, following the VMI
precedent, upheld an injunction ordering Faulkner's admission unless
South Carolina established an alternate state-funded program for wo-
men.3 0 5 In noteworthy language, the Faulkner court rejected the prin-
ciple of equal rights for women. The court asserted that the Equal
Protection Clause does not mean that "all men are created equal,"
which in the court's view was an "overly generalized statement. 3 0 6
Instead, in language that would sound ominous to the critics of the
VWIL program at Mary Baldwin College, the opinion advised that
"the clause accommodates the opposite notion; that people are cre-
ated differently. Fundamental injustice would undoubtedly result if
the law were to treat different people as though they were the
same." 30 7 The court continued by stating that "[s]ometimes the gross-
est discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though
they were exactly alike." ' 8 In context, the court's message was that
the sexes are so different that they should also be treated differently
by the law. Since gender differences are as irrelevant as racial differ-
ences for deciding whether an applicant has the characteristics needed
to qualify for admission to the Citadel-as proved by Shannon Faulk-
ner's initially successful application when the Citadel assumed she was
male-the court's emphasis on the importance of sex differences in
this context reveals that members of the federal judiciary are unable
to move beyond sex stereotyping. This is encouraged by equal protec-
tion jurisprudence itself, which, by subjecting sex discrimination to the
more lenient intermediate scrutiny standard, implies that it is gener-
ally more reasonable and therefore easier to justify than race discrimi-
nation. The court seemed comfortable with these disparate standards
for sex and race discrimination: "A regulation that classifies by gen-
der, such as that at issue in this case, is not subject to the same strict
scrutiny as is one that classifies on the basis of race or national origin
due to the acknowledged differences between males and females. 30 9
303. 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993).
304. Id. at 226.
305. Id. at 232-33.
306. Id. at 230.
307. Id.
308. Id. The court also cited the ruling in Rostker that had allowed a classification
requiring men but not women to register for the draft. Id.
309. Id. at 231. Of course, if one assumed that the court in the Faulkner case did not
really intend to support sex discrimination but only realistic accommodation of sex differ-
Pretending that the two sexes occupy complementary roles that
have been ineluctably predetermined by their sex differences is one
way of making discrimination appear natural and, hence, fair. As
Deborah Rhode has noted, one can justify sex inequality by adjusting
definitions of "equality" to encompass the notion that each sex has
distinctive attributes, roles, and rewards that are "separate but
equal. ,310
The variation in judicial attitudes that women seeking equal pro-
tection from U.S. courts may encounter is illustrated by the conflicting
views of Judges Hamilton and Hall on the merits of Faulkner's suit.
Judge Hamilton found the Faulkner decision too harsh-toward the
Citadel. In a dissent pervaded by hostility towards Faulkner, as a wo-
man whose "sole purpose is to gatecrash her way into the Corps of
Cadets,"' 31' Judge Hamilton insisted that there was no demand for a
Citadel-type education for women. 12 The judge maintained that
Faulkner had no "sincere desire to seek and obtain the type of disci-
pline and leadership training afforded by the Citadel. '313 According
to the judge, Faulkner was "more interested in publicity, notoriety,
and purchasable opportunities of being the first female admitted to
the Corps of Cadets. '314 It appears that for Judge Hamilton the real
problem with Faulkner's suit was that she aspired to join an institution
where, according to his sex stereotyping, women simply did not
belong.
In contrast, Judge Hall was critical of the court's failure to order
the integration of academies like VMI and the Citadel.315 Judge Hall
suspected that the VMI and Citadel cases "have very little to do with
education. They instead have very much to do with wealth, power,
and the ability of those who have it now to determine who will have it
later. 3 16 Judge Hall condemned the VMI court ruling for having
ences, one could also read the opinion as expressing an innocuous recognition that there
are actual differences between women and men, such as women's ability to become preg-
nant and bear children. The broadness of the language, however, would easily lend itself to
the accommodation of different rights for women based on stereotypes about women's
different nature.
310. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 222, at 1755.
311. Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 1995). Appellants filed a motion for
recall and stay of the June 5, 1995 mandate in this case pending their filing of a petition for
writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but their petition was denied. 66 F.3d 661,
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
312. Id. at 451, 456.
313. I& at 456.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 451.
316. Id.
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failed to ascertain "the true purpose behind the state's decisions to
keep women out of VMI, ' 317 a failure caused by the court neglecting
to ask "the only question that matters: Why has the state decided to
create or maintain this institution for the benefit of only one gen-
der? ' 318 Judge Hall seems to have grasped an essential point that
judges too often fail to consider in applying intermediate scrutiny-
the relationship between the particular instance of sex-based discrimi-
nation at issue and the perpetuation of a broader regime of masculine
privilege.
Judge Hall's grasp of this essential issue is reminiscent of Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.319 Differing from his fellow
Justices, Harlan insisted that it was necessary to consider the historical
context in deciding whether segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Harlan appreciated that the reason Louisiana had ra-
cially segregated railroad cars was not to stop Whites from sitting in
Black cars, but rather to exclude Blacks from White cars. 320 Similarly,
in her Faulkner concurrence, Judge Hall called for Faulkner's exclu-
sion from the Citadel to be placed in historical and sociological con-
text so that its discriminatory impact could be appreciated.3 2 1 Again,
the unwieldy intermediate scrutiny standard seems to have en-
couraged the other judges to discount the historical context of sex
discrimination.
On May 26, 1995, the Justice Department filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court that attacked the acceptance of the Mary Baldwin
program by the district court and circuit courts.322 In its appeal, the
Justice Department challenged the constitutionality of excluding wo-
men from the rigorous military-style public educational program at
VMI when the alternative was a program not equivalent.' a In partic-
ular, it claimed that the circuit court decision had invoked "harmful
gender stereotypes to justify offering vastly different state-supported
leadership programs to women and men. '324 A Supreme Court ruling
on this important case is expected in June 1996.325
317. I&
318. Id.
319. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
320. I& at 557.
321. 51 F.3d at 451.
322. See U.S. Asks Justices to Open Military School to Women, REUTERS NORTH AMER-
ICAN WnE, May 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
323. Id.
324. IL
325. U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), cerL granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1995) (Nos. 94-2107 and 94-1941).
F. Women's Rights in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Critical Assessment
Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on the Justice De-
partment appeal in the VMI case, American women still face
problems under the intermediate scrutiny standard, as it allows judges
to factor in sex stereotypes in deciding whether discrimination is un-
constitutional. The results in the VMI and Citadel cases suggest that
the methodology used under the Fourteenth Amendment is part of
the problem. As has been noted, it is not an efficient tool for dealing
with sex-discrimination in schools. 326 The ways sex stereotyping influ-
enced the rulings in the VMI and Faulkner cases confirm the skeptical
remarks made by Chief Justice Rehnquist when the intermediate scru-
tiny standard was articulated in Craig v. Boren,3 27 where he com-
plained about the vagueness of the standard and bemoaned that
"important governmental objective" and "substantially related" were
troublesome phrases that were "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite
subjective judicial preferences or prejudices. ' '328
Why does the U.S. Supreme Court stand by the clumsy and con-
fusing intermediate scrutiny test? Perhaps it is because the test seems
normal, given the current state of constitutional jurisprudence. As
Horwitz has asserted, the current Court's jurisprudence is "sur-
rounded by a thick undergrowth of technicality. '3 29 He laments that:
"[t]here is no recognition that the world is rapidly changing and that
the Court's understanding of the role of law may be growing danger-
ously out of touch with American society."330 Instead, there are
methodological obsessions: "[w]ith three or four 'prong' tests every-
where and for everything, with an almost medieval earnestness about
classification and categorization; with a theological attachment to the
determinate power of various 'levels of scrutiny."'' 331 This correlates
with the Court's "hostility to constitutional change," which is in turn
connected to "a particular conservative legal style," which Horwitz
describes as "static originalism. '33 2 He further observes that: "Deeply
rooted in the early religious culture that gave it birth, static original-
ism has been modem American legal culture's chief means of infusing
the nation's founding political document with an objective authority
326. See Note, supra note 295, n.68.
327. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
328. Id at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
329. Horwitz, supra note 90, at 98.
330. d
331. Id
332. Id at 99.
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that modernism refuses to concede. 3 33 This emphasis on formal sys-
tems, accompanied by pretensions to the achievement of content neu-
trality, is seen to accord "with the persistent yearning in American
constitutional culture to separate law from politics. ' 334 The result is
the Court's creation of "increasingly general categories that are ab-
stracted from concrete or particular power relations,133 5 and "reified
and abstract conceptions that are out of touch with life.13 36
While Horwitz wrote before VMI and Faulkner were decided, the
results in these cases bear out his earlier analysis. With their preoccu-
pation with the fine points of intermediate level scrutiny, both opin-
ions are detached from and show no recognition of political realities.
As Judge Hall noted, the question that should have been asked was
why Virginia and South Carolina had established these schools for
males only.337 However, in the course of grappling with components
of intermediate level scrutiny, such as substantial relationships and
government interests, other judges were distracted from this main
issue.
As the military academy cases show, such an approach does not
help courts focus on whether women are being denied equality. What
the principle of equality offers women seeking equal rights differs sig-
nificantly from what equal protection offers. One way of grasping the
difference is by stepping back and asking how an ordinary person who
has not been educated in equal protection jurisprudence would define
equality. Such a person would be highly unlikely to define equality
using anything like the standard that the Supreme Court has devel-
oped under the Equal Protection Clause. When one looks at the
straightforward assertions of the equality of women in modem consti-
333. 1&
334. Id.
335. l
336. Id at 100. Horwitz's assessment that formalism and the attendant preoccupation
with tiers of scrutiny lead the Court's analysis away from the real world has been borne out
in a recent case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. C.t. 2097 (1995), dealing with
whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should be applied to an affirmative action program
created by the federal government. In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out that the
majority's ruling that racially-based affirmative action plans had to withstand strict scrutiny
or be ruled unconstitutional had the paradoxical consequence that the government could
enact affirmative action programs more easily for women than racial minorities. Adarand,
115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Noting this anomaly, Justice Stevens aptly ob-
served that, "when a court becomes preoccupied with abstract standards, it risks sacrificing
common sense at the altar of formal consistency." I& I am indebted to Bert B. Lockwood,
Jr., for pointing out the relevance of Justice Stevens' dissent.
337. See supra notes 315-321 and accompanying text.
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tutions and international human rights law,338 one sees principles that
correspond to what the ordinary person would understand by "equal-
ity"-that women are entitled to enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and
opportunities as men.
The test for sex discrimination used by the Canadian Supreme
Court provides a relevant standard for comparison with the U.S. inter-
mediate scrutiny standard. The Canadian test conceives of discrimina-
tion in terms of whether a law or policy aggravates the disadvantages
of a persistently disadvantaged group.3 39 Among other things, this
"requires judges to look at women as they function in the real world
to determine whether women's ... deprivation of power is due to
their place in a sexual or gender hierarchy." 34 It is not surprising that
the Canadian standard has developed in a context where there is a
constitutional guarantee of equality for women and an admonition in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that rights are to be
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."' Thus, the
Canadian scheme starts with the norm of equality for women and
places a heavy burden on the party seeking to justify discrimination by
taking into account the real world situations in which women tend to
be disadvantaged. Under this approach, it would be harder to justify
excluding women from VMI and the Citadel and relegating women
cadets to inferior institutions.
One should consider the implications of the absence of any con-
stitutional safeguard for women's equality-or any substitute that
might potentially be afforded by ratifying CEDAW without qualifying
its equality principles-in connection with the approach used to de-
cide the VMI and Citadel cases. If one began with the notion that
women are entitled to equal rights, would not the analysis and results
in these cases be different? For example, Mary Becker maintains that
an ideal constitution would contain a substantive sex equality provi-
sion and asserts that such a provision would at least "require judges to
take into account detrimental impact on women when approaching
other constitutional provisions as well as legislation and other govern-
mental action."" 2 As Catharine MacKinnon has remarked, an equal
rights provision could help provide a new constitutional emphasis that
338. See supra note 211.
339. Cook, State Responsibility, supra note 30, at 156.
340. Id.
341. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 1.
342. Becker, supra note 71, at 457.
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would lead to placing priority on rectifying the legal inequality of
groups that are historically unequal in society. 43 MacKinnon sees the
equality principle as one that "allows critique of the social partiality of
standards."'3 " She has also called for placing equality analysis in the
context of existing inequalities and asking "whether the policy or prac-
tice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an under-
class or a deprived position because of gender status.1345 It is
reasonable to presume that starting from the notion that women
should have equality would lead to conclusions different from those
reached when starting from the principles of equal protection jurispru-
dence. The question that Judge Hall lamented that the courts had
failed to ask-why the state had chosen to exclude women from a
prestigious military academy34 6-would most likely have been asked if
there had been an ERA in place or an equivalent guarantee of equal-
ity under a ratified human rights treaty such as CEDAW.
G. Summary: U.S. Law versus CEDAW Standards
United States law is seriously deficient when measured by
CEDAW standards, as it fails to uphold the most fundamental of
CEDAW principles-women's right to equality. Women in the
United States have never been guaranteed equality in rights, and the
constitutional jurisprudence elaborating the middle-tier standard on
which women depend for relief under the Equal Protection Clause
falls short of an equality guarantee. It affords women limited, tenuous
protections-in part because, as the recent cases show, many judges'
attitudes are imbued with sex stereotypes that can easily be factored
into rulings under the middle-tier scrutiny standard. In contrast, Arti-
cle 2(a) of CEDAW calls for constitutions and laws to embody the
principle of equality and Article 5(a) calls for the elimination of
prejudices based on stereotyped roles for men and women. In other
words, U.S. law evinces the kinds of features that CEDAW is intended
to correct, so that ratifying CEDAW holds the promise of leading to
improvements in the rights of U.S. women. Of course, CEDAW ratifi-
cation will only have a salutary effect on women's rights if CEDAW is
not nullified by a package of RUDs designed to ensure that U.S. wo-
men's rights remain unchanged. Unfortunately for those who aspired
343. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 213, at 1325.
344. IL at 1326.
345. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979).
346. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
to see U.S. law move to adopt the principle of women's equality, the
proposed RUDs, along with the RUDs previously entered to the
ICCPR, were specifically designed to preserve the status quo.
VI. U.S. Reactions to the International Norm of
Women's Equality
A. The U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR Equality Provisions
Curiously, little attention has been devoted to examining U.S.
stances on the international norm of women's equality. This may ac-
count for the lack of strong protests over the U.S. "understandings"
affixed to the ICCPR Article 2(1) and Article 26 equality provisions.
These so-called understandings deserve consideration since the pack-
age of RUDs appended to CEDAW becomes intelligible only if one
grasps the significance of the U.S. understandings previously affixed
to these ICCPR articles. Article 2(1) requires each party to undertake
to ensure that all individuals within its jurisdiction enjoy the rights
afforded in the ICCPR "without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.' '1 47 Further, Article 26
provides that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimina-
tion on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.3 48
The United States did not offer a "reservation" to these provi-
sions, which would have squarely indicated that the United States was
not prepared to accept some or all of the guarantees of equality in
Article 2(1) and Article 26. Instead, its comments were classed as an
"understanding," 349 implying that the United States was merely at-
tempting to clarify its interpretation of the equality mandate. How-
ever, rather than clarifying the U.S. position, the understanding
muddied it. For example, the wording of the U.S. understanding in-
cluded the assertion that:
[T]he Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all
persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive pro-
347. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
348. Id. at 179.
349. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 126.
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tections against discrimination. The United States understands
distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or any other status... to be permitted when such distinc-
tions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental objective.35 °
One is struck by the fact that the three separate tiers of scrutiny
used in Equal Protection cases are neither mentioned nor adequately
explained. Instead, they are collapsed into a single rational basis cate-
gory. Furthermore, no accurate description is given of the impact of
middle-tier scrutiny on women's ability to claim equal rights, and
there is no acknowledgment that sex-based discrimination can survive
constitutional challenges in situations where race-based discrimination
would be ruled unconstitutional.
It seems unlikely that the U.S. State Department lawyers could
not outline the three tiers of scrutiny accurately. It is also difficult to
believe that the authors of this obscurely worded "understanding" ac-
tually imagined that equal protection jurisprudence, with its three
tiers and confusing standards, afforded equality to people in the same
sense as international law, so that nothing more than a clarification of
U.S. standards was needed. In actuality, this understanding is a dis-
guised reservation that would allow the United States to continue to
follow equal protection jurisprudence instead of affording equality to
U.S. women. The absence of any policy statement saying that the
United States endorsed the principle of full equality for women and
was committed to take all necessary steps to bring U.S. law up to in-
ternational standards confirmed the intention to stand by the status
quo. Indeed, the decisions in the VMI and Citadel cases, which were
made after the ratification of the ICCPR, could be cited as proof that
U.S. courts are sticking with the status quo, rather than consulting the
equality principles of the ICCPR.
Although the U.S. Constitution is referred to in the "understand-
ing," this reservation was not compelled by the Constitution because,
as already noted, nothing in the Constitution precludes a higher stan-
dard of rights.35 1 Middle-tier scrutiny merely sets criteria for ascer-
taining when discrimination can be upheld; it does not mean that
affording women equal rights would be unconstitutional. In the ab-
sence of a constitutional reason compelling the United States to enter
this understanding, the likely reason would be a preference to retain
350. Id
351. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
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laws denying U.S. women the full equality that they were promised
under international law.
In an article defending the package of U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR,
David Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refu-
gees, U.S. Department of State, resorted to equivocations to obscure
the U.S. position. Stewart denied that the United States was declining
to accept any obligation to modify U.S. law and rejected the conten-
tion that there were broad and significant differences between U.S.
law and major substantive requirements of the Covenant.35 2 Interest-
ingly, in his discussion of the U.S. understanding of Article 2(1) and
Article 26 equality provisions, Stewart at no point mentioned wo-
men's rights-nor did he offer any details of how U.S. law treats sex-
based discrimination.353 The standard of intermediate scrutiny, which
was not accurately represented in the text of the U.S. "understand-
ing," was also never clarified in Stewart's discussion. Instead, Stewart
confined himself to areas where patterns of discrimination in U.S. law
would not be controversial. 354
What the U.S. understanding entailed was probably not clear
even to most Americans who read it.355 The ACLU assessment was
more perceptive than most in finding the understanding misleading,
calling it "an imprecise and erroneous statement of current national
law [which] confuses well-established equal protection standards for
different groups, merging them all into one vague and misleading test
.... This understanding is thus at best superfluous, at worst a mis-
352. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 14 HuM.
Rrs. L.J. 77, 78 n. 11 (1993).
353. Id. at 80-81.
354. Stewart conceded that in U.S. law "[d]iscrimination is only prohibited for specific
statuses, and there are exceptions which allow for distinctions. For example, even under
the generally protective Age Discrimination Act of 1975, age may be taken into account in
certain circumstances." Id. at 80. He also said that distinctions were permitted between
citizens and non-citizens and different categories of non-citizens. Id. Since one would nor-
mally expect legal systems to make certain distinctions based on age and alienage, Stewart
seems to have purposefully selected examples from categories that would not expose the
deficiencies of U.S. equal protection jurisprudence to criticism.
355. For example, Hoffman and Strossen, who are otherwise very critical of U.S. RUDs
to the ICCPR, which almost eliminate the possibility of it having domestic effect, do not
seem to appreciate that full equality for women is one of the internationally guaranteed
rights that is being excluded via the RUDs. See generally Hoffman & Strossen, supra note
140, at 477, and especially the list of ways that rights would have been expanded had the
United States not imposed its package of RUDs on the ICCPR, id. at 492.
Spring 19961
792 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:727
statement of our jurisprudence.13 56 Although Stewart complained
that the ACLU had missed the point in criticizing the U.S. under-
standing, because the difficulty lay in the ICCPR language, not in the
U.S. understanding, 57 the murkiness of the U.S. understanding was
unmistakable. Significantly, the ACLU seems to have missed the real
problem-that U.S. law did not comply with the international stan-
dard of equality for women and treated sex discrimination as less seri-
ous than racial discrimination. If such an "understanding" could be
difficult for a U.S. organization to fathom, it is not surprising that ob-
servers in other countries could not grasp exactly what it meant.
With the support of other commentators, the ABA, which has
reformed its once hostile attitude towards human rights, claimed that
the U.S. understanding to the ICCPR articles 2(1) and 26 was unnec-
essary, both because U.S. law generally complied with the nondiscrim-
ination requirements of the Covenant, and because the U.N. Human
Rights Committee had stated that differentiation was permissible if
the criteria were reasonable and objective and if the aim was to
achieve a legitimate purpose under the Covenant.358 The ABA appar-
ently shared the common misperception that U.S. equal protection ju-
risprudence was compatible with the ICCPR equality provisions, and
that it was also in conformity with the Human Rights Committee's
interpretation of equality. In defending the U.S. understanding,
David Stewart took comfort from the ABA position,35 9 and he used
the ABA's assertion that the understanding was unnecessary to but-
tress his contention that U.S. law measured up to ICCPR equality pro-
visions.360 Further, Stewart cited the ABA for taking the position that
Article 26 could not possibly intend to obliterate distinctions like
those between citizens and non-citizens, since no state could comply
with a standard that barred distinctions between citizens and non-citi-
zens.3 61 Again, the critical issue-the impact of the intermediate tier
scrutiny standard on women's rights-was sidestepped and a non-is-
sue substituted.
356. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1183, 1197 (1993).
357. ld.
358. Id. at 1196-97.
359. Mat 1197.
360. Id.
361. Id.
B. The Muted International Reaction
The unintelligible version of U.S. equal protection jurisprudence
contained in the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR equality provisions seems
to have effectively confused the international community. Other par-
ties to the ICCPR do not seem to have recognized that the effect of
the U.S. understanding would be to deny to U.S. women the full
equality guaranteed them under the ICCPR Articles 2(1) and 26. It is
noteworthy that in their objections to the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR,
representatives of countries that had objected to the U.S. death pen-
alty reservation, including robustly feminist Scandinavian delegations,
failed to register objections to this U.S. "understanding."362 Sweden
seems to have been the lone exception, but its own objection was con-
fusing; it admonished that "some of the understandings made by the
United States in substance constitute[d] reservations to the Cove-
nant. ' 36 3 Curiously, in the list of U.S. RUDs to which it registered
objections, Sweden mentioned the U.S. understanding as it affected
Article 2, but did not question its effect on Article 26.364
The significance or potential impact of the U.S. understanding on
women's equality also seems to have been missed by the Fifty-third
Session of the Human Rights Committee, according to the report of
the meeting of March 29 and 31, 1995.365 The Committee specifically
dealt with the official U.S. denials that its RUDs had canceled out
ICCPR provisions and the U.S. efforts to persuade the Committee
that the U.S. RUDs were not sweeping. Against all evidence, Conrad
K. Harper, Legal Adviser in the U.S. Department of State, insisted
that the U.S. RUDs were "limited, focused and justified" and that the
U.S. had taken no "general reservations to the Covenant. '366
Not surprisingly, the report the United States submitted to the
Human Rights Committee on its compliance with the ICCPR367 was
less than a full and frank account of the legal status of U.S. women.
Troubling rulings like those in the VMI and Citadel cases were not
cited, and the tendency of judges to use sex stereotypes in deciding
whether discrimination was justified was not mentioned. In the sec-
tion entitled "Equal rights of men and women," the test used under
the intermediate standard of scrutiny was briefly referenced,368 with-
362. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 56, at 127-30.
363. IL at 129.
364. Id. at 130.
365. ICCPR Reports, supra note 198.
366. Press Release Human Rights Committee March 29 Mtg., supra note 200, at 6.
367. ICCPR Initial Reports, supra note 202.
368. Id. at 30-31.
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out being described as intermediate or middle-tier. Further, nothing
in the relevant section states that the United States allows sex discrim-
ination where racial discrimination is prohibited.
In the same section, the report asserted, in a shocking misstate-
ment of U.S. law, that "the U.S. Constitution explicitly guarantees
men and women equality before the law through the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments. '3 69 How could such a guarantee be given "explicitly" in consti-
tutional provisions that had been drafted with no express reference to
women and in contexts where it was obvious that women's rights were
not covered?37° The belated and often grudging willingness of courts
since 1971 to read some protection for women's rights into these con-
stitutional provisions hardly amounts to an "explicit" constitutional
guarantee. Of course, the absence of explicit constitutional guaran-
tees makes the gains women have made subject to cancellation. This
case law could be eroded in the same way the constitutional protec-
tion for women's right to abortion enunciated in Roe v. Wade 371 was
weakened in cases like Planned Parenthood v. Casey.372 Rights de-
pendent on the whims of judges may be contrasted with the Nine-
teenth Amendment guarantee that the right to vote will not be denied
on the basis of sex373-the only "explicit" constitutional guarantee
ever possessed by U.S. women.
369. Id. at 30.
370. That the Fourteenth Amendment excluded women from its protection has already
been discussed, supra part V.C. Obviously, the Fifth Amendment, having been drafted in
the eighteenth century, when women were still classified with children and idiots and
treated accordingly, was not intended to offer any guarantee of women's equality. That it
had an equal protection component at all was an invention of the Supreme Court in Boil-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The patently flimsy pretense that there was an equal
protection principle in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was necessitated
because the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the federal government. Since the
Court had decided it should invalidate school segregation as mandated by the states under
the Equal Protection Clause and realized that not invalidating the same kind of segrega-
tion in the federally-run schools in the District of Columbia would mean great embarrass-
ment, it forced a reading of the Fifth Amendment to enable it to get consistent results in
the cases challenging racial segregation by the federal as well as state governments. For a
critical discussion of this unpersuasive reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment, see
DAVD P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER FOR THE PEO-
PLE, 65-66 (1988). Although the Fifth Amendment might also be tortured to provide a
basis for saying that it afforded something like an equal protection guarantee for women,
even the most imaginative judicial construction could not convert Fifth Amendment due
process into a provision "explicitly" affording a guarantee of equality for women.
371. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
372. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
373. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIV.
Although regretting the extent of the U.S. RUDs, the ICCPR
committee did not challenge the false claim that the U.S. Constitution
guaranteed women equality before the law. It offered no criticism of
the understanding that had been entered to Articles 2 and 26 and ex-
pressed no concern over the impact this would have on U.S. women's
ability to claim equality. The Chilean expert, Cecilia Medina Quiroga,
came closest to opening the delicate subject of whether laws in the
United States actually conformed to international standards when she
ventured to ask a question about U.S. compliance with the equality
provisions of Article 2. Noting that under the Covenant discrimina-
tion based on sex was as prohibited as discrimination based on race,
Medina Quiroga asked if there were states in which women did not
have the same rights as men and, if so, what measures the federal
government would take to remedy this disparity.374 Apparently mol-
lified by the assurances of the U.S. delegation, Quiroga dropped her
questioning and professed that the United States had "a long tradition
of democracy and of the promotion of human rights. It was true that
many standards of the United States were higher than international
standards. There were advantages to being a great country. ' 375 While
this last compliment was apparently not meant to be sarcastic, a per-
son assessing this statement from a more cynical perspective could
have taken it in a different sense: as a recognition that, as the most
powerful country in the world, the United States had advantages in
the sense of being able to get away with sweeping reservations to the
ICCPR that, if entered by weaker states, would have, at a minimum,
provoked inquiries-and probably condemnation.
From the reactions of other states, what Horwitz had decried as
the "thick undergrowth of technicality" 376 of U.S. constitutional juris-
prudence seems to have functioned as an effective screen concealing a
policy of denying women full equality. In speaking of lessons that he
had learned in his work on constitutions in new democracies, Judge
Richard Nygaard asserts that in our increasingly interdependent
world, people must be able to rely on consistent rights standards:
[I]t is important that rights be expressed in identical standards
to enable a constitutional lawyer or court in one country to use
374. Press Release: Human Rights Committee March 29 Mtg., supra note 200, at 14.
Medina Quiroga seems not to have perceived that it was the low standard of protection for
women's rights afforded under the federal Constitution that allowed sex discrimination to
be treated as less serious than race discrimination, and that it was the details of the equal
protection standard that she should have been inquiring about.
375. Press Release: Human Rights Committee March 31 Mtg., supra note 204, at 5.
376. Horwitz, supra note 90, at 98.
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precedent from around the world to interpret the right at issue.
Draftsmanship must guard against time-dated, time-bound, or
idiomatic descriptions of rights, which can be distorted in the
adversarial arena. General terms are no longer sufficient, and
specifics cannot be left to the vagaries of a court to interpret.
Detail is essential .... Information is now exchanged rapidly,
and distance means nothing. As a consequence, and because it
is very likely that a citizen of one country will know the rights of
a citizen in another, I felt it imperative that the citizens of differ-
ent countries within the constitutional community have identical
rights. Equality within and among countries will tend towards a
power equilibrium. Inecuality will lead to instability. No coun-
try is now isolated ....
Nygaard's observations are well-founded; they go some way to-
ward explaining why the United States is able to get off lightly after
entering RUDs that amount to rewriting its commitments under inter-
national human rights covenants on the matter of women's rights.
The United States is isolated and insulated from international scrutiny
by virtue of its hyper-technical equal protection jurisprudence. U.S.
standards for judging the constitutionality of sex discrimination are as
far as possible from the standardized norms that Judge Nygaard is
calling for. Instead of stating a specific standard that is immediately
recognizable as conforming or non-conforming to the modern norm of
women's equality, the U.S. standard on women's rights is as idiosyn-
cratic as it is complicated. Its interpretation is highly unpredictable,
and its impact on individual cases is contested even among the federal
judiciary and the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are its creators
and guardians. Judge Nygaard does not-and, due to his judicial posi-
tion, may feel that he cannot-attack U.S. rights formulations for fail-
ing to conform to modern standards. However, others might find that
his assessment bears directly on the reasons why U.S. law on women's
equality should be deemed deficient.
VII. The U.S. Response to CEDAW
A. The Impact of Political Shifts
Political developments have affected U.S. positions on the merits
of ratifying CEDAW. Democrats, who tended to favor ratification of
the ERA, have been more favorable to CEDAW ratification than
Republicans. President Jimmy Carter, whose tenure in office was
marked by enthusiastic promotion of human rights, signed CEDAW in
377. Nygaard, supra note 96, at 199.
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July 1980.378 When CEDAW was first transmitted by the executive
branch to the Senate, President Carter's Secretary of State Edmund
Muskie wrote a letter describing the treaty.379 He did not propose any
RUDs, although he left open the possibility that RUDs would be pro-
posed by the Foreign Relations Committee, and indicated that there
seemed to be broad backing for ratification. 80 Secretary Muskie as-
serted that:
[CEDAW] is a significant accomplishment of the United Nations
system and an important advance in the development of the in-
ternational law of human rights. United States adherence to this
Convention is in the national interest and in the interest of the
world community. It is our hope that the United States, after
full consideration by the Senate, will become a party to the
Convention.38'
Notwithstanding Muskie's expression of support for CEDAW, the
State Department prepared a memorandum identifying certain as-
pects of the treaty that could present problems, and it expressed the
usual worries about potential conflicts with U.S. federalism and the
U.S. requirement that state action exist for discrimination to be sub-
ject to regulation.382 However, at that point in U.S. history, the polit-
ical climate seemed auspicious for adopting the proposition that
women should be guaranteed equal rights, and the ERA seemed to be
on the verge of ratification.383 In comments on Article 2 of CEDAW,
which contained the basic principle that discrimination against women
should be eliminated, a State Department memorandum appears to
have anticipated that compliance with CEDAW would be facilitated
by the passage of the ERA, noting that the ERA had already been
ratified by thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states, that the ratifi-
cation period had been extended to June 1982, and that the President
378. HALBERSTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111, at 32.
379. Id app. E.
380. After describing CEDAW the letter said:
Specific language for implementing legislation or reservations is not being recom-
mended at this time. When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wishes to
take action regarding the Convention, interested agencies will meet upon request
with the Committee and its staff to discuss the necessary language. If this ap-
proach is followed there will be no constitutional or other legal obstacles to ratifi-
cation of the Convention by the United States. The Departments of Justice,
Health and Human Services, Education, and Labor, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concur with this
assessment and are enthusiastic in their support of the Convention.
Id at 138.
381. Id
382. See id. app. F.
383. See id. at 17.
Spring 19961
798 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:727
and the Congress "have acted affirmatively and to the fullest extent of
their authority to effectuate its passage."3" However, the memoran-
dum did not reckon with the impact that Reagan's election would
have on the prospects for ratifying the ERA. In retrospect, the late
months of 1980 may have constituted the high-water mark for official
support for full equality for U.S. women. After Jimmy Carter left the
White House, the executive branch withdrew its support of CEDAW
ratification for twelve years.
The failure of U.S. women to organize a more energetic campaign
on behalf of CEDAW seems puzzling. Perhaps the demoralizing im-
pact of the 1982 defeat of the ERA explains why American women
did not mobilize more effectively to press the Senate to move forward
with CEDAW ratification. Another factor may have been the distrac-
tions of combatting campaigns to restrict women's reproductive free-
doms, which preoccupied various U.S. feminist organizations in the
1980s as conservatives mobilized to overturn Roe v. Wade.385 The po-
tential long-term importance of CEDAW ratification may therefore
have fallen by the wayside.
Since the Reagan and Bush Administrations did not support rati-
fication of CEDAW, neither bothered to develop a formal package of
RUDs.386 Under President Clinton, the United States has again pro-
fessed a commitment to ratifying CEDAW.387 However, even before
the Republican successes in the elections of November 1994 and while
Democrats still remained in control of Congress and the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, the Clinton Administration was recom-
mending that ratification of CEDAW be accompanied by RUDs. 3 88
The proposed RUDs once again comprised sweeping reservations that
were designed to uphold U.S. law at the expense of CEDAW princi-
ples, and they were in sharp contrast to the limited reservations made
by countries like France, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Spain.389
384. Il at 140-41.
385. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
386. See Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15 WHrITIER
L. REV. 319, 335 (1994). Of course, as already discussed, supra part VI.A., the RUDs that
the Bush Administration had attached to the ICCPR had negative implications for wo-
men's rights. One assumes that similar ones would have been appended to CEDAW if the
Administration had decided it should be ratified.
387. The U.S. position is outlined in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT
ON CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WO-
MEN, S. Doc. No. 99-115, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE CEDAW
REPORT].
388. Id. at 5-8.
389. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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B. The Proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW
In discussing the proposed ratification of CEDAW, members of
the U.S. Senate were reluctant to admit that U.S. law fell short of the
standards required by international human fights law or to acknowl-
edge that the package of RUDs had been designed to preserve the
non-conforming standards of U.S. law.39° In September 1994, the re-
port on CEDAW by the majority of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations seemed to assume that U.S. domestic law already ensured
women's equality.3 91 The majority report asserted that "[e]xisting
U.S. constitutional and statutory law and practice provide broad and
effective protections and remedies for women against gender-based
discrimination." 392 Thus, the report took the same complacent posi-
tion as had been taken with regard to the equality provisions in the
ICCPR, speaking as if U.S. law was sufficiently advanced to comply
with international norms. The report asserted that: "[U.S. law] is
largely consistent with the provisions of the Convention. In those few
areas where U.S. law and the Convention differ, the administration
has proposed a reservation or other form of condition to clarify the
nature of the obligation being undertaken by the United States. 3 9 3
That is, the report presented the proposed U.S. reservations as if they
did not signify disagreement with the object and purpose of CEDAW.
In a 1994 letter attached to the report, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher discussed the RUDs to CEDAW in detail a 94 As part of
the public record, this letter should be treated as official commentary
on the U.S. RUDs. In his comments, the Secretary seemed to mini-
mize disparities between U.S. law and the Convention.395 As a result,
despite providing explanatory details that go far beyond the text of
the RUDs, his letter provides no accurate portrayal of how U.S. law
on women's equality compares with CEDAW norms.
As will be indicated, the list of RUDs aimed to ensure that
CEDAW would be ineffective and that ratification would not obligate
the U.S. to afford women any new rights.3 96 The issues raised by the
RUDs deserve more thorough discussion and evaluation than can be
offered in this Article, where the list of RUDs is only reviewed in
cursory fashion to establish the pattern in the U.S. rejections of
390. See generally SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387.
391. See id. at 4-5.
392. Id. at 5.
393. IML at 4.
394. See id. at 8-50.
395. See id.
396. See infra notes 398-436 and accompanying text.
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CEDAW principles. As will be argued in what follows, the most sig-
nificant reservation of all was the rejection of the principle of equality
for women, which was not even listed among the RUDs, but was indi-
cated in an accompanying letter by the Secretary of State. 97 It is this
reservation that is the main concern of this Article.
C. The Reservations
The first reservation warned that "[tihe United States does not
accept any obligation under the Convention to enact legislation or to
take any other action with respect to private conduct except as man-
dated by the Constitution and laws of the United States. '398 The res-
ervation indicated that the U.S. would not be complying with aspects
of CEDAW since "by its terms the Convention requires broad regula-
tion of private conduct.., under Articles 2, 3, and 5 .1399 After assur-
ance that the Constitution and U.S. laws "establish extensive
protections against discrimination,"4 0° the reservation stated that the
U.S. had priorities different from those of CEDAW, advising that "in-
dividual privacy and freedom from governmental interference in pri-
vate conduct are also recognized as among the fundamental values of
our free and democratic society."401
By this reservation, the United States indicated that it would con-
tinue to tolerate discrimination against women by private actors in the
interest of protecting other values to which the United States ac-
corded great importance. This would significantly reduce the impact
of any CEDAW ratification. As is well known, much of the discrimi-
nation and mistreatment suffered by women occurs at the hands of
private actors in so-called private spheres, meaning that CEDAW's at-
tempt to reach discrimination in private spheres is "uniquely impor-
tant" for the goal of eliminating discrimination against women.40 2 The
397. See infra notes 437-442 and accompanying text.
398. See SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51.
399. ld.
400. Id.
401. Id
402. See Zearfoss, supra note 29, at 908-09. It has been a struggle at the international
level to obtain recognition that regulating private actions is essential to protect women's
human rights. For background on the issue of how treating "private" discrimination affect-
ing women as lying beyond the scope of state responsibility perpetuates women's vulnera-
ble, subordinate status and harms women, see Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes
Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85
(Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RGI-s OF WOMEN]; Donna Sullivan,
The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law in WOMEN's RiGHTs,
U.S. philosophy on rights was therefore profoundly at variance with
CEDAW. This philosophy was justified by U.S. constitutional juris-
prudence that had developed in relation to a Constitution in which
women's rights and interests had been ignored except in the Nine-
teenth Amendment.
The first reservation could also be traced to U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on issues such as the First Amendment rights to free-
dom of religion, speech, and association, which could pose constitu-
tional obstacles in the way of carrying out various CEDAW
obligations where non-governmental actors were involved. Because
religious groups in the United States have been particularly active in
combatting equal rights for women, the solicitude shown by the judici-
ary for protecting freedom of religion boded ill for women aspiring to
equality.40 3 The common assumption that the right to religious free-
dom must outrank concerns for women's right to equality is contested
by supporters of women's equality. In this connection, the lower
ranking of the equality right may relate to the absence of an ERA that
would signal that women's equality was a "fundamental value" that
could not be lightly dismissed.4 4 Becker proposes that a strong con-
stitutional provision on sex discrimination "might help judges balance
other rights, such as free exercise of religion, against the right of wo-
men to social equality. '405  CEDAW equality provisions could not
substitute for a U.S. constitutional guarantee of equality and could not
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea
Wolper eds., 1995).
403. See Zearfoss, supra note 29, at 919.
404. Id. In this connection, a constitutional equality guarantee might prompt a more
skeptical appraisal of the merits of according tax-exempt status to religious institutions that
teach that women are inferior or that discriminate against women. Feminists have chal-
lenged this tax-exemption, asserting that withdrawing it would not violate freedom of reli-
gion. See Becker, supra note 71, at 481-82, 515; Rebecca J. Cook, State Accountability
Under the Women's Convention in Human Rights of Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WO-
MEN, supra note 402, at 240-41. Becker suggests that the tax provisions on the housing
allowance or housing costs exemption for "ministers of the gospel," postage subsidies for
religious organizations, and awards of government contracts should be reconsidered in the
case of religions that discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring. Becker, supra note 71, at
483-84. An equality guarantee for women could potentially also provide a basis for chal-
lenging the currently proliferating plans for states to provide school students with vouchers
for education at private religious schools that discriminate against women or teach students
that women are inferior. For preliminary assessments of the debates on the constitutional-
ity of school voucher plans, see Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law
and Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711 (1993); Note,
Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 424
(1995); Note, Religious Groups in the Educational Marketplace: Applying the Establishment
Clause to School Privatization Programs, 82 GEo. L.J. 1869 (1994).
405. Becker, supra note 71, at 515.
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encourage judges to give greater weight to women's right to equality
if, from the outset, the United States ratified CEDAW with the caveat
that the existing hierarchy of fights would continue. This is another
area where standing by judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitu-
tion blocks any rethinking of the U.S. position on women's fights and
precludes taking steps to attack sex discrimination that are called for
in CEDAW. Although such balancing of rights takes place with refer-
ence to the Constitution, the lines drawn in such exercises in distin-
guishing between public and private areas do not follow specific
constitutional prescriptions, but rather are the product of what are ul-
timately political choices.40 6
Article 5 of CEDAW imposes obligations on states to take action
to eliminate prejudices and customary and other practices that are
based on the idea of women's inferiority or stereotyped sex roles.40 7
In the case of the U.S. reservation affecting CEDAW Article 5, as in
the case of the U.S. reservation to the ICCPR prohibition of hate
speech, there was a potential conflict between a treaty provision and
policies set forth in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Judicial inter-
pretations of the First Amendment would require that priority be
given to the protection of freedom of speech over the protection of
women's equality by prohibiting speech that would tend to degrade
women and reinforce their subjugation. The priorities that allow un-
fettered speech to promote the idea of women's inferiority embodies
the outcome of a balancing exercise that is like the balancing that re-
sults in protection of hate speech directed at ethnic, religious, and
other minorities on First Amendment grounds.0 8
The Secretary of State clarified that the United States would not
undertake to regulate speech pursuant to CEDAW. He indicated that
the article is not construed-by which he seemed to mean that it
should not be construed-as requiring states to take action against
those who advocate "the idea of inferiority of [sic] the superiority of
either of the sexes. '40 9 The policy is in line with the established pref-
erence in U.S. law of favoring First Amendment freedoms over laws
curbing speech that feminists would tend to see as damaging to the
cause of women's rights-a preference that has, as noted, a political
dimension.410 This controversial U.S. policy of giving more weight to
406. See Zearfoss, supra note 29, at 918 n.71.
407. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 25.
408. See infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
409. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 27.
410. See Defeis, supra note 170, at 128; JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy. The
Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103,143-45 (1994).
freedom of speech than to the deleterious effect of allowing speech
that reinforces notions of women's inferiority is similar to its policy of
rejecting curbs on hate speech and has been subject to sharp
criticism.41'
However, not all of the limits that the United States set on gov-
ernmental action pursuant to CEDAW were so closely connected with
policies associated with constitutional jurisprudence. Comments by
the Secretary of State, as amplified in the Analysis of Provisions and
Explanation section of his letter, indicated that some of the laws guid-
ing the U.S. rejection of CEDAW's reach to the private sphere were
merely federal statutes.412 Although one could argue that the circum-
scribed reach of these statutes could have been shaped to some extent
by concerns not to infringe constitutionally protected rights, the word-
ing of the reservation indicates that the United States did not intend
to take any steps to eliminate private discrimination against women,
even where expanded governmental regulation would not infringe
constitutional limits.
The wording of the reservation on private conduct was therefore
broader than strictly necessary to avoid conflicts with the Constitu-
tion. For that purpose, it would have sufficed to state that the United
States would carry out CEDAW mandates except in cases where there
was a conflict with constitutional principles. The Lawyers Committee,
which found the reservation "undesirable" as a "broad limitation that
implies a lack of political commitment to observe international stan-
dards" proposed that, at most, the United States could put forward "a
reservation saying that under this article the United States is not re-
quired to forbid private discrimination protected by the Constitu-
411. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs (1991); ANDREA DwoR-
KIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR
WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988). MacKinnon's ideas were relied on by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R. 4th 449 (1992). It ruled that violent, dehumanizing,
and degrading materials portraying women as objects for sexual exploitation threatened
the achievement of true equality between men and women, which justified restricting the
freedom of expression where certain types of pornography were involved. For general
background on the tensions in this area, see also CAss R. SUNSTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 178.
412. He stated that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not apply to private employ-
ers with fewer than 15 employees, religious institutions, or tax-exempt private clubs, and
that Title IX of the of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 does not apply to private
institutions that receive no federal funds or to certain types of private institutions that do
receive federal funds. Moreover, he noted that in U.S. law "religious organizations are
generally not subject to gender discrimination laws." SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra
note 387, at 19.
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tion. '413 Another proposal for a reservation to deal with possible
constitutional objections in this connection was: "Nothing in this
[treaty] requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States. 414 By entering an
unnecessarily broad reservation, the United States effectively sent a
message that it would not rethink the tolerance that U.S. law had tra-
ditionally showed for private discrimination against women. 415
The second reservation stated that the United States "does not
accept an obligation under the Convention to assign women to all mil-
itary units and positions that may require engagement in direct com-
bat." '416 This "reservation" was unnecessary to avoid conflicts
between U.S. law and CEDAW. The most directly relevant CEDAW
provision is probably Article 7, which requires states parties to take
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
public life, but it has not been interpreted as prohibiting all discrimi-
nation against women in the military.4"7 This is a rare situation where
the U.S. "reservation" is actually of lesser magnitude. The statement
seems to be more in the nature of an understanding designed to clarify
a certain vagueness in the equality provisions of CEDAW that might
potentially be construed as requiring elimination of bars to women
serving in combat. Again, the Lawyers Committee objected to the
reservation, asserting that the United States should at a minimum of-
fer a commitment "to continuing current efforts to open all combat
positions to women."4 18
The third "reservation" was also unnecessary and reinforced the
impression that the Clinton Administration was trying to placate con-
servative opponents of CEDAW ratification by attaching reservations
that precluded conservatives from arguing that CEDAW entailed ac-
cepting ideas that they had anathematized. This reservation asserted
that the United States was not accepting "any obligation under the
Convention to enact legislation establishing the doctrine of compara-
ble worth as that term is understood in U.S. practice. '419 CEDAW did
413. Senate CEDAW Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (Sept. 27, 1994) (Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Claiborne Pell,
September 26, 1994, in attached section: Appendix-Legal Analysis) [hereinafter Lawyers
Committee letter to Senator Pell].
414. Fletcher, supra note 386, at 339.
415. See Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell, supra note 413, at 79.
416. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51.
417. See Fletcher, supra note 386, at 343.
418. Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell, supra note 413, at 80.
419. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51.
not require use of the doctrine of comparable worth to set remunera-
tion.420 Since there could be no need to exclude an obligation that
CEDAW did not impose, what was involved was actually a clarifica-
tion, not a reservation. Again, this understanding was probably cate-
gorized as a reservation in order to sound more reassuring to
suspicious U.S. conservatives. The Lawyers Committee's observation
that this reservation was unnecessary seems warranted. 421
The fourth reservation advised that the United States did not ac-
cept the obligation under Article 11(2)(b) to introduce maternity
leave with pay or comparable social benefits without loss of former
employment, seniority or social allowances.4' This did amount to a
reservation-one that revealed a disinclination to upgrade domestic
U.S. laws to international standards. This U.S. policy left U.S. work-
ing women in a situation where they could be penalized for bearing
children,423 and bereft of maternity leave protections established by
other North Atlantic countries.42 4 The U.S. preference for maintain-
ing the status quo, regardless of whether there was a constitutional
reason for doing so, again suggests that the real reason for CEDAW
reservations might be a general disinclination to consider upgrading
U.S. laws.
D. The Understandings
The understandings included the usual indication that the federal
government would act in accordance with the U.S. system of federal-
ism in implementing CEDAW.41 The Lawyers Committee found this
reservation undesirable and denied that the language was constitu-
tionally required.426 Whether such RUDs regarding the U.S. scheme
420. Id. at 36. It could be argued that comparable worth was implied under CEDAW
provisions such as Article 11(1)(d) which establishes the right "to equal remuneration,
including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value." Id
421. Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell. supra note 413, at 80.
422. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51.
423. The Lawyers Committee noted that there was no federal law providing for paid
leave after childbirth or requiring an employer to reinstate a woman who had taken mater-
nity leave without loss of seniority or allowances. In comments on this reservation, the
Lawyers Committee pointed out that there was a significant gap in U.S. law regarding paid
maternity leave as compared with laws in Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Portugal, Japan, Sweden and Spain. Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell,
supra note 413, at 81.
424. Id.
425. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51-52.
426. See Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell, supra note 413, at 81. The Commit-
tee argued that the Constitution gave the federal government power to carry out its treaty
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of federalism are needed in the case of CEDAW has been challenged
by scholars.427
Another "understanding" stipulated that the United States would
not accept "any obligation under the Convention, in particular under
Articles 5, 7, 8, and 13" to adopt legislation or any other measures to
restrict individual freedom of speech, expression and association "to
the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and the laws of
the United States."42 This understanding was an attempt to exclude
and modify relevant CEDAW provisions, and thus should have been
classified as a reservation. The rationale for this understanding was
related to the first reservation, indicating that the United States would
not follow the CEDAW provisions on regulation of private conduct or
undertake measures that could infringe rights established under the
First Amendment.429 The Lawyers Committee did not take issue with
the U.S. position, apparently accepting the balancing of rights as es-
tablished in U.S. law and therefore considering it appropriate to have
an understanding that emphasized that the freedoms of speech, ex-
pression, and association under the First Amendment could not be
restricted.430
The United States also entered an understanding to Article 12,
which mandated equal access to appropriate health care services, in-
cluding those related to family planning, and ensured access to mater-
nity care for free when necessary. 3' The United States understood
this article as allowing it to decide which health care services should
be provided and when it was necessary to provide them for free.432 Of
course, such health care services are vital for women in general, and
free services are vital for poor women in particular. A poor Third
World country might be expected to indicate that there would be eco-
nomic obstacles in the way of implementing Article 12. However,
when an affluent country like the United States declines to guarantee
such services to women who need them, it is not due to the impossibil-
ity of providing the services but is the result of the policy makers dis-
counting the needs of women. The understanding added to Article 12
obligations, and that the matters involved in CEDAW were subject to the treaty and legis-
lative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id.
427. See, eg., HALBERsTAM & DEFEIS, supra note 111, at 54-56; Zearfoss, supra note
29, at 930.
428. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 51-52.
429. See infra notes 398-402 and accompanying text.
430. See Lawyers Committee letter to Senator Pell, supra note 413, at 82.
431. Id.
432. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 52.
was yet another revelation of the low ranking of women's well-being
in the calculations of those who formulate U.S. policy.
An understanding that had not figured in the original list of pro-
posed RUDs was added at the last minute by a voice vote in the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on September 27, 1994.433 This
understanding, proposed by Senator Jesse Helms, clarified the United
States view that nothing in CEDAW created a right to abortion and
that abortion should in no case be promoted as a method of family
planning.4 1 Since abortion was not mentioned in CEDAW, this un-
derstanding was unnecessary and most likely proposed to appease ad-
amant foes of abortion and please the conservative Senator's domestic
constituency.
E. The Declarations
As is usual in its human rights treaty ratifications, the United
States also declared that CEDAW would be treated as non-self-exe-
cuting.435 This simply meant that it would not take effect domestically
unless and until implementing legislation was passed.
The final declaration indicated that the United States declined to
be bound by the dispute resolution provision of Article 29(1), which
requires compulsory submissions of disputes under CEDAW to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).436 The U.S. position regarding
this article was not exceptional, since many other countries had indi-
cated that they also did not intend to follow Article 29(1). However,
for those interested in a stronger CEDAW system, it was disap-
pointing to learn that the United States would be continuing its prac-
tice of refusing to submit to the jurisdiction of the most prestigious
international forum to resolve human rights claims. In ruling out ICJ
jurisdiction, the United States was hardly setting an example that
would advance the effectiveness of women's human rights.
F. Disguising the Significance of the Proposed U.S. RUDs
to CEDAW
All of the proposed U.S. RUDs to CEDAW deserve to be indi-
vidually dissected at length, but the cursory review offered here sim-
433. See id. at 3.
434. Id. at 52.
435. Id The controversial U.S. position that human rights treaties should be non-self-
executing, which reflects the reluctance to allow Americans to sue based on them, is too
large a topic to be adequately examined in this Article. For an introduction to the litera-
ture, see Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1180 n.39.
436. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 52.
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ply highlights the overall U.S. pattern of refusing to adjust its laws to
conform to CEDAW norms. The central concern of this Article is
whether the United States was effectively rewriting the convention via
RUDs that were incompatible with the object and purpose of guaran-
teeing full equality to women and eliminating all forms of discrimina-
tion against women. The survey of RUDs to the ICCPR and CEDAW
shows that the answer must be yes. However, the U.S. State Depart-
ment attempted to hide U.S. resistance to upgrading its law to meet
the international norm of equality for women.
The most interesting aspect of the list of CEDAW RUDs is the
area of U.S. law not covered. What is missing becomes clear when the
RUDs are contrasted with the understanding that had been entered to
the ICCPR Articles 2(1) and 26 that expounded on how the United
States understood the principle of equality. As has already been dis-
cussed,437 the U.S. understanding to the ICCPR referred, albeit only
vaguely and evasively, to the differentiations that were allowed under
the Equal Protection Clause. A grasp of the impact of the U.S. consti-
tutional standard of intermediate scrutiny of sex discrimination was
essential to understand the impact of the U.S. RUDs. It was not coin-
cidental that the intermediate scrutiny standard was not set forth in
the text of the U.S. RUDs to CEDAW. Laying out the three tiers of
scrutiny in the U.S. RUDs would have made it all too obvious that
U.S. law fell below international standards.
Although the RUDs do not mention the middle-tier standard,
provision had to be made for its continuing application. Inconspicu-
ous passages in the Secretary of State's accompanying letter specified
that the United States will continue to follow the middle-tier standard
after CEDAW ratification. After reading through initial sections of
the Secretary of State's letter explaining the RUDs, one finally en-
counters the first mention of "intermediate scrutiny" in a passage
under the rubric "Relevant U.S. Law. '438 Admitting that this stan-
dard is "not as searching as the strict scrutiny that courts apply to
racial or ethnic distinctions," the Secretary nonetheless asserted, using
a phrase employed in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,439 that
this standard required "that gender-based distinctions be .supported
by an 'exceedingly persuasive justification."'" 0 Taken out of context,
this language conveys the impression that middle-tier scrutiny is more
437. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
438. See SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 15.
439. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
440. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 15 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
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demanding than it actually is. Under the rubric "Article-by-Article
Analysis" in a discussion of Article 1 of CEDAW, the Secretary revis-
ited the topic of U.S. equal protection standards, and he stated the
principle of intermediate scrutiny, that "a gender-based distinction
can withstand constitutional challenge if it serves an important objec-
tive and is substantially related to the achievement of that objec-
tive."441 He indicated that the State Department was assuming that
the definition of discrimination in Article 1 of CEDAW did not intend
to classify such distinctions as discriminatory, and that Article 1 was
therefore consistent with U.S. law.442
This statement, which bears directly on U.S. willingness to com-
ply with CEDAW, and which should have appeared in the text of the
U.S. RUDs, appears highly disingenuous. There is much in CEDAW
that clearly affirms the Article 1 call for full equality for women,
which has no counterpart in U.S. constitutional law. The treatment of
women under U.S. domestic law was not constrained by any guaran-
tee of equality for women, and it was not purged of discriminatory
features and sex stereotyping. That being the case, one plausible rea-
son for the knowledgeable legal experts from the State Department to
assert that U.S. law on discrimination measured up to CEDAW stan-
dards was a wish to hide the disparity between U.S. and international
standards.
Of course, the ultimate motive of those who sought to hide the
gap between equal protection and equality for women may have been
something other than a wish to deceive. Facing daunting difficulties
due to the prevailing hostility towards human rights in the Senate,
they may have felt compelled to try to reassure suspicious conserva-
tives that endorsing CEDAW would not mean a treaty substitute for
the defeated ERA. It is understandable that sincere supporters of
human rights who would like the U.S. to play a more constructive role
in the international human rights system could think that, as a matter
of political strategy, it was prudent to minimize the disparity between
U.S. equal protection jurisprudence and international law in order to
discourage resistance to the idea that the U.S. should become a mem-
ber of the CEDAW system.
The gap between U.S. law and CEDAW should have been appar-
ent to legal experts, but for any reader unversed in U.S. law and unfa-
miliar with the patterns of double-talk about CEDAW, the official
U.S. "apology" for its treatment of women would be confusing. It
441. 1I at 20.
442. Id.
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would take more time than the average person would be likely to
spend to unravel these statements and discover that they amounted to
a roundabout way of declaring the U.S. intent to continue following its
domestic equal protection jurisprudence, a standard that could change
with shifts in domestic judicial trends.
The Secretary of State also cited cases in ways that would have
been misleading for an international audience. In mentioning cases
that U.S. feminists would point to as proving the deficiencies of U.S.
equal protection jurisprudence, he cited them as if they supported his
contention that U.S. law was already in substantial compliance with
CEDAW norms. For example, in a section on the effect of CEDAW
ratification on women in the military, he chose to mention the case of
Rostker v. Goldberg,4 3 in which Justice Rehnquist had used sex stere-
otyping in delivering an opinion upholding the male-only draft.444
Secretary Christopher made no mention of Rehnquist's use of sex
stereotyping. Moreover, in his discussion of co-education, the Secre-
tary cited the outcomes of both the first round of the VMI cases and
the decision in the Citadel case as if they were positive develop-
ments.44 However, the reasoning of these cases actually undermines
official U.S. claims to possess laws in conformity with CEDAW princi-
ples guaranteeing women equal rights. The outcomes of the cases,
which allow discrimination based on sex stereotyping and assert that
barring women from access to prestigious institutions is constitutional
even when no truly equivalent institutions are available for women,
are not only at variance with general CEDAW principles but also
seem to conflict with Article 10, which calls for ensuring equal rights
for women in education." 6
443. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
444. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 23. The decision is discussed supra
notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
445. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 32-33. In the Secretary's defense,
these cases were included at a stage when the outcomes made it possible to argue that the
courts were protecting women's rights by ordering women to be admitted to these all-male
state-sponsored academies unless suitable alternatives could be offered. Thus, one could
say that, at the time the Secretary's letter was composed, it was unclear whether the courts
would rule that women could be excluded from these institutions even when the alterna-
tives were as inferior as the programs at Mary Baldwin and Converse College turned out to
be. However, there was enough in the reasoning offered in the first rounds of these cases
to signal to a critical eye that sex discrimination was being tolerated where racial discrimi-
nation would have been condemned and that some judges were thinking in terms of sex-
stereotypes, which could only be harmful to women's rights.
446. Article 10 of CEDAW does not require coeducation, but it is at odds with the VMI
and Citadel cases in calling in section (a) for the same conditions for access to studies and
in calling in section (b) for the elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men
In his discussion of Article 2 of CEDAW, which required parties
"to pursue by all appropriate means ... a policy of eliminating dis-
crimination against women," the Secretary asserted that the United
States "condemns and seeks to eliminate discrimination against wo-
men."" 7 However, the package of RUDs that the United States was
proposing to CEDAW and had already entered to the ICCPR indi-
cated that the United States would not seek to move against discrimi-
nation that was tolerated by U.S. law and revealed that the
government considered the status quo sufficient for U.S. women. The
failure of the United States to commit to any further measure to elimi-
nate discrimination against women was glossed over. In a serious mis-
characterization of U.S. laws, the Secretary maintained that:
The principle of equality between men and women is reflected
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as in
federal and state legislation .... While few would argue that
gender-based discrimination does not exist in the United States
or that there is no room for additional legislative and other steps
in this regard, it is not open to serious debate that the legislation
and other measures currently in force in the United States are
sufficient to meet the general requirements set forth in Article2. 448
In reality, the Fourteenth Amendment does not "reflect" any
principle of equality between men and women, and therefore U.S. law
is not in compliance with Article 2. As the foregoing analysis of the
U.S. RUDs to CEDAW has shown, the United States was declining to
follow Article 2(a) of CEDAW, which calls on states to undertake
"[t]o embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation. '449 Relying on
his mischaracterization of U.S. law and the fanciful claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment afforded U.S. women an equality guarantee,
Secretary Christopher asserted that CEDAW Article 2 would not re-
quire the United States to enact an Equal Rights Amendment to the
Constitution.45 ° That is, no ERA was needed to secure equality since
the Constitution already, according to him, "reflected" equality be-
tween men and women. His tortured explanation about why no ERA
would be required in the wake of any U.S. ratification of CEDAW was
most likely intended as a gesture to mollify conservative Senators who
and women in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation. See CEDAW, supra
note 1, at 38-39.
447. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 22.
448. Id.
449. See supra notes 438-442 and accompanying text.
450. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 22.
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might decide to oppose ratifying CEDAW on the grounds that it
would require reviving the defeated ERA project. However, the Sec-
retary's reassurance on this point was superfluous. What would apply
in the United States upon CEDAW ratification was not CEDAW itself
but CEDAW as eviscerated by the set of proposed U.S. RUDs to
CEDAW and the RUDs previously entered to the ICCPR, which were
designed to ensure that U.S. law would not be altered. Although
some of the Secretary's comments seemed to suggest that there might
be official recognition that U.S. laws affecting women leave room for
improvement,451 nothing in the package of RUDs indicated that the
United States was prepared to question any of its laws or to undertake
any reforms whatsoever to bring them in line with CEDAW. Having
excluded and modified fundamental CEDAW obligations via its
RUDs to the ICCPR and the package of RUDs that it proposed to
enter upon ratification of CEDAW, the United States committed itself
to nothing more than following existing U.S. law.
The gap between the self-congratulatory posture that the U.S
adopts when speaking to the international community about its
human rights accomplishments and the altogether less prepossessing
reality of the U.S. domestic rights situation is exemplified by com-
ments that were made in 1993 by a spokesperson for the U.S. Depart-
ment of State after the Vienna human rights conference. The
comments were to the effect that the United States was perturbed by
other countries' use of culture to justify denying rights to women. The
United States charged:
Some governments excuse the fact that women have a lesser sta-
tus than men by pointing to culture and tradition. However, cul-
ture and tradition cannot excuse gross and systematic violations
of human rights. One of our primary goals at the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights was to stress that human rights are uni-
versal. As Secretary Christopher said in his speech to the
conference, "We cannot let cultural relativism become the last
refuge of repression." We cannot allow women to be the excep-
tion to the fundamental principle of human rights universality.
The United States affirms the principle of cultural diversity, but
does not believe that cultural tolerance should be used to justify
abuse of human rights.45
One would not have surmised from this attack on appeals to cul-
tural relativism that the United States followed the parochial notion
that the rights in the U.S. Constitution should set the maximum limits
451. Id.
452. 1993 U.S. Dept. of State, Dept. of State Dispatch, vol. 4, No. 41, Oct. 11, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File.
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on rights to prevent U.S. women from claiming human rights afforded
them under international conventions, or that the United States was a
country where appeals to culture could block the ratification of an
international human rights convention. Yet, as the debates on
CEDAW ratification heated up, cultural relativism was explicitly in-
voked by U.S. conservatives in the Senate to justify their rejection of
CEDAW.
G. Opposition to CEDAW in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
CEDAW opponents in the Senate include powerful senators like
the arch-conservative Jesse Helms, who, after the Republican victories
in November 1994, became the new chair of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. He was belatedly joined in his opposition to
CEDAW by Senator Nancy Kassebaum. When the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee met on September 29, 1994, Senator Kassebaum
addressed Senator Helms and offered this negative evaluation of
CEDAW:
I would like to express my thoughts on this convention. Cer-
tainly I am sure all of us, indeed, Senator Helms, would like to
end any discrimination that may be apparent against women,
but I'm going to vote no on this convention. I have some seri-
ous problems with such a broad convention as applying to all the
countries around the world and just have to wonder what is
meant by mandate all appropriate measures to ensure equal
rights to family benefits, financial credit, and participation in all
aspects of cultural life.453 I don't know that it serves the United
Nations well to somehow, somehow to [sic] be engaging in a
convention that doesn't allow for differences in cultural, differ-
ent cultural (pause) principles, more or less, mores, religions
and I, I'm sympathetic to wanting to end any discrimination in
financial credit, benefits and so forth, but I am not sure that it is
necessarily something that should consume the time of the
United Nations on this broad agenda. For that reason I am vot-
ing no.454
453. The reference is to Article 13 of CEDAW, which says states "shall take all appro-
priate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in other areas of economic and
social life," and specifies that these include family benefits, financial credit, and participa-
tion in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life. See CEDAW supra
note 1, at 40. This is a non-controversial provision of CEDAW, one to which no U.S.
reservation had been entered and where none would have been anticipated.
454. This transcript of the Senator's remarks was provided to me by an individual who
was present and transcribed Kassebaum's remarks from a tape recording that she made.
This individual prefers to remain anonymous. The "aaaa's" with which the Senator liber-
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These comments, which bear the hallmarks of having been hur-
riedly thrown together, failed to set forth any coherent convincing ex-
planation for Kassebaum's rejection of CEDAW.455 On the one hand,
ignoring the State Department's lecture that cultural relativism should
not be used to make women's rights the exception to the principle that
human rights are universal, Senator Kassebaum seemed to find
CEDAW objectionable for affording protection for women's rights ac-
cording to a universal standard that might not be acceptable to all
cultures and all religions. That is, she seemed to find it too broad and
general, not sufficiently accepting of local variations and cultural di-
versity. Senator Kassebaum also seemed to be objecting that the U.N.
should not be writing treaties that delved into matters like the exten-
sion of credit, perhaps on the theory that such matters were local con-
cerns in which the international organization was improperly
meddling. Thus, her remarks simultaneously asserted that the con-
vention was too broad and too specific.
Senator Kassebaum's remarks were largely rewritten for the sec-
tion of the Foreign Relations Committee report which presented the
minority's reasons for rejecting CEDAW. The minority members in-
sisted that they shared "the majority's strong support for eliminating
discrimination against women,"" an assertion that strained credulity
when pronounced by someone like Senator Helms who is notorious
for his opposition to human rights and for his fights against civil rights
in general and women's equality in particular.
After giving lip service to the idea that discrimination against wo-
men was wrong, the minority members indicated that their concern
resulted from the notion that CEDAW would be ineffectual and there-
fore harmful to the authority of human rights.45 7 The minority also
claimed to be unpersuaded that CEDAW was a proper or effective
means of pursuing the objective of eliminating discrimination against
women, and it expressed fear that "creating yet another set of unen-
forceable international standards will further dilute respect for inter-
national human rights. 458 Because CEDAW depended on voluntary
compliance, the minority was "hesitant to invest much hope that it will
ally punctuated her remarks, which were faithfully transcribed, have been eliminated here.
Transcript on file with author.
455. I have requested clarification from Senator Kassebaum on this matter but have
received no answer.
456. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 53.
457. Id. at 53-54.
458. I. at 53.
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lead to real changes in the lives of women."'459 It warned of the need
to guard against treaties that overreach, since by promising more than
can be delivered "we risk diluting the moral suasion that undergrids
[sic] existing covenants on fundamental human rights. '4 60
It was odd for the minority to bemoan the lack of effectiveness of
CEDAW while simultaneously seeking to prevent the United States
from joining CEDAW and having a voice on the committee, where it
could potentially work to strengthen the CEDAW system. Not only
was the United States proposing to reject many of the basic substan-
tive principles in CEDAW, but, by insisting that the treaty was to be
non-self-executing and refusing to submit to the ICJ regarding dis-
putes arising under CEDAW, the United States had signalled its pref-
erence that CEDAW be toothless and ineffectual. The same minority,
which was asserting its concern that CEDAW would not be sufficiently
strong and professing worry that CEDAW principles were unenforce-
able, had shown no interest in excising any of the U.S. RUDs that
weakened CEDAW. In light of the Senate's history of condemning
international human rights, its reluctance to ratify human rights trea-
ties, and its use of RUDs to nullify commitments under human rights
treaties, the expression by the minority of concern about the erosion
of "the precious moral authority"'" essential to protect human rights
rang hollow.
The minority also disputed the notion that a primary value of
CEDAW was to establish a widely accepted set of international stan-
dards for protecting the rights of women. The minority seems to have
been persuaded that there was no international acceptance since more
than fifty countries had entered reservations to aspects of CEDAW.46
459. Id
460. lId
461. Id. at 54.
462. These included the Islamic reservations of Libya and Bangladesh, which, the mi-
nority complained, were "so broad as to appear to be at variance with the object and
purpose of the treaty itself." IL The Islamic reservations made by Libya and Bangladesh
were singled out for the Senators' particular disapprobation, without any explanation of
why no mention was made of similar Islamic reservations by countries like Egypt and Mo-
rocco, close and valued friends of the United States, and Kuwait, on whose behalf the
United States had led the Gulf War coalition. However, the discrepancy can be accounted
for assuming that the aim of the minority was to cast aspersions on states that had imposed
Islamic reservations and to associate CEDAW with countries that had negative images or
were not close allies, thus leading to a preference for citing only CEDAW parties like Libya
and Bangladesh.
The objection that the minority made to the breadth of the Bangladeshi and Libyan
reservations seemed extremely odd in the light of the CEDAW reservations that the
United States was proposing, which were at least as broad as the Bangladeshi and Libyan
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Furthermore, the minority fretted that there had been "an apparent
inability to prohibit even the broadest reservations," indicating that in
the view of the minority, "CEDAW may reach beyond the necessarily
restrictive scope of an effective human rights treaty. ''4 3
The minority also complained of a "disturbing trend" of diverting
resources by the executive branch and non-governmental organiza-
tions to focus on U.S. ratification of treaties rather than promoting
norms represented by those treaties "in the countries where they are
under attack."' Of course, the minority did not acknowledge that
U.S. women's rights were under attack, in part by conservative politi-
cians like Senator Helms and his ideologicial affies, or that the
CEDAW guarantee of equality could help U.S. women achieve the
equal rights that they had been struggling for since the nineteenth cen-
tury. Rejecting the view that the United States must be a party to
CEDAW in order to criticize or encourage other governments in their
practices regarding women, the minority scoffed at the notion of con-
ceding "to countries such as Libya the moral high ground on women's
issues simply because they have signed an unenforceable conven-
tion. '4 65 How the United States could claim the moral high ground in
this regard was not explained.
The final comments in the minority report are worth quoting in
full:
We believe that the evolution of internationally accepted norms
regarding human rights and dignity is important and must be
carefully encouraged. It must, however, take place within an in-
ternational system of sovereign nations with differing cultural,
religious and political systems. Pushing a normative agenda be-
yond that system's ability to incorporate it leads, we believe, to
what is represented by this convention: a document with 136 sig-
natures, a committee that meets for two weeks a year, and a
slow erosion of the precious moral authority that is the essential
[sic] to the protection of fundamental human rights.4 6 6
ones. Like the Islamic reservations, the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR and CEDAW had the
damaging feature of upholding domestic law at the expense of treaty obligations. Despite
professing disapproval of the breadth of CEDAW reservations, not only had the Senate
minority not objected to the breadth of the U.S. RUDs to CEDAW, but it had insisted on
adding yet another "understanding" to the list. Thus, the minority was choosing exceed-
ingly weak grounds for launching an attack on Bangladesh and Libya on a matter where
the United States itself was particularly vulnerable to criticism.
463. SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 54.
464. 1&
465. IMt
466. Id.
This last paragraph abounded in paradoxes, not the least of which
was the concern for the slow erosion of the precious moral authority
of human rights incongruously professed by Senators who were show-
ing no desire to strengthen the international human rights system.
Furthermore, in objecting to ratifying CEDAW because the principle
of equality for women was not widely accepted, the minority seemed
to misconstrue the nature and purpose of human rights treaties.
Naturally enough, human rights conventions focus on problem ar-
eas. Thus, it would have been odd to have a Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Men, a hypothetical
"CEDAM." Around the globe, states have not discriminated against
men as a class nor treated them as subordinate, inferior beings enti-
tled to fewer rights than women. If the idea behind human rights trea-
ties was to devise treaty provisions based on states' current conduct of
affairs, with the aim of universal compliance without strain or signifi-
cant adjustments, a treaty like this hypothetical CEDAM might make
sense. However, human rights treaties are designed to protect those
who need protection. Pressures to draft CEDAW had emerged pre-
cisely because women's rights, which were outlined in general ways in
treaties like the ICCPR, were being so pervasively violated that per-
sons concerned with rectifying the abuses decided that a separate,
specialized treaty was needed to address the problem of discrimina-
tion against women. The rationale was that establishing a universal
norm of non-discrimination on the basis of sex was vital. Thus, it was
strange, indeed, for the minority to object to CEDAW on the grounds
that countries were still discriminating against women in violation of
CEDAW principles.
Even more mystifying was the minority's concern that CEDAW
had to confront a system of nations with different cultural and reli-
gious systems. Of course, appeals to differences in cultural and reli-
gious systems had been precisely what was behind the "Islamic"
reservations to CEDAW entered by countries like Libya and Bangla-
desh, which the minority report seemed to decry and the toleration of
which it had suggested might "cheapen the coin" of human rights trea-
ties generally. The expected corollary would have been that the mi-
nority would insist on upholding the international norms of CEDAW
against delinquent Muslim states. But Kassebaum's statement on
September 29, 1994, had suggested that she might find CEDAW objec-
tionable because CEDAW was offensive by the standards of U.S. cul-
ture and religion. If that were the basis for the objections by the
committee minority, it would mean adopting the same stance as
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Libya-to the effect that culture and religion could override CEDAW,
a stance the minority purported to find objectionable. Of course, the
two positions could be reconciled by assuming the ethnocentricity of
the minority on the committee. If this were so, cultural and religious
objections to CEDAW based on U.S. or Christian values would be
legitimate, but reservations based on "Islam" mooted by Muslim
countries would not deserve respect. Even if this ethnocentric out-
look explains the seeming inconsistency in the minority's positions, it
remained unarticulated. The minority became, it seems, entangled in
a web of inconsistencies.
The determined opposition of conservatives like Senator Helms
to CEDAW might seem odd in light of the sweeping RUDs that the
United States was proposing to add. What accounts for the persistent
opposition by Helms and others to ratifying a convention that had
already been aborted by the list of RUDs appended to it, as well as
the Secretary of State's letter indicating that the domestic Fourteenth
Amendment standard would continue to set the limit on women's
rights? One can surmise two reasons. First, conservatives had a long
history of being hostile to human rights treaties, regardless of their
capacity to change U.S. law.467 From the standpoint of conservatives,
it has been a virtual article of faith that ratification threatens the U.S.
Constitution and legal order. One recalls that Senator Helms re-
mained opposed to ratifying the Genocide Convention even after im-
portant RUDs had been appended at his insistence.468 Secondly,
Senators like Helms can also win points with their conservative con-
stituencies by opposing a convention that aims at guaranteeing equal
rights to women. Profoundly suspicious of international law, many
conservative voters are unlikely to approve of U.S. ratifications of
human rights treaties like CEDAW even if they have been neutralized
in advance by RUDs.
Because the majority on the Foreign Relations Committee fa-
vored ratifying CEDAW, a resolution favoring ratification went to the
Senate after a thirteen to six vote.469 However, the Senate vote on
CEDAW ratification that had been expected in October 1994 was
blocked by a secret manoeuver permitted under Senate rules that is
known as a "hold."470 After the Republican victories in November
467. See generally KAUFMAN, supra note 101.
468. See supra notes 120 and accompanying text.
469. See SENATE CEDAW REPORT, supra note 387, at 3.
470. I have been unable to find anyone who can identify the Senator who imposed the
"hold."
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1994 and the conservative tilt of the new Senate, the likelihood of any
favorable Senate vote on CEDAW ratification seemed to have dimin-
ished considerably. Indeed, the amendment to the Foreign Relations
Revitalization Act of 1995 adopted on August 1, 1995, showed that the
Senate was not in sympathy with women's rights. The amendment
instructed the U.S. delegates to the Beijing Women's Conference that
they were to promote the importance of motherhood, to uphold the
traditional family as the fundamental unit of society, and to define
gender as the biological classification of the two sexes.47' The passage
of this amendment, which gratified conservatives, revealed how the
U.S. Senate's thinking about women's rights aligned with the views of
the Vatican and conservative Muslim countries, both of which likewise
objected to the notion that the different roles assigned men and wo-
men in society were not biologically determined but socially con-
structed, and also insisted upon protection of the traditional family. 2
In circumstances where a ratification proposal might well fail if
CEDAW were submitted to the full Senate for consideration, it was
doubtful whether all CEDAW proponents would even want to risk a
vote on the Senate floor. In any event, even if CEDAW were ratified,
it could offer no prospect of enhanced rights for U.S. women as long
as the present package of RUDs, along with the relevant commentary
by the Secretary of State, precluded CEDAW from having any effect
on domestic standards.
VIII. Conclusion
Countries are expected not to make reservations to international
treaties that allow them to escape their treaty obligations and adhere
instead to conflicting standards in their domestic laws, and particularly
not where the reservations are ones that will defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty. Reservations based on a preference for uphold-
ing domestic law are often too vague and open-ended for other states
parties to know the precise nature of the deviations that will ensue
and whether or not the reservations are compatible with the treaty in
question. Ignoring the objections to such reservations, the United
States has found that the international community will be more toler-
ant of treaty reservations upholding the supremacy of domestic laws
where the appeal is to institutions that enjoy a special, sacred status
471. For discussion of this amendment, see 141 CONGa. Ruc. S10,973 (July 10, 1995)
(amendment of Sen. Hutchison); 141 CONG. REc. S10,961 (July 10, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hutchison).
472. See supra note 49.
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like the U.S. Constitution. Not willing to accept the CEDAW norm of
equality for women, the United States has proposed to enter signifi-
cant constitutional reservations when and if it ratifies CEDAW, just as
it did to provisions in the ICCPR.
Referring to the U.S. Constitution to enter obscure and confusing
treaty reservations would, of course, be unnecessary if the United
States either intended to meet CEDAW standards or if it were pre-
pared to state candidly and clearly where it would not meet CEDAW
obligations. The U.S. constitutional reservations are associated with a
pattern of dissimulation and obfuscation designed to disguise non-
conforming features of relevant U.S. laws. Analysis of official U.S.
statements accompanying these reservations reveals that, instead of
accurately describing the impact of constitutional norms on women's
rights, these statements attempt to present domestic law as if it were
closer to complying with CEDAW norms than it actually is. There
seems to be a sense that describing the principle that sex discrimina-
tion can be justified according to a more lenient standard than racial
discrimination could expose the United States to international criti-
cism. By its lack of candor about the extent to which its law deviates
from international law, the United States has demonstrated that it ap-
preciates the superior normative force that international human rights
standards have obtained, despite its unwillingness to accommodate
these via reforms in its domestic laws.
Analysis reveals that in most areas the Constitution by itself is
not so much at fault for the problems that the United States has had in
complying with international human rights norms as are underlying
policies of preserving the status quo. The United States upholds do-
mestic legal norms in conflict with international human rights law
even where the international standards do not conflict with the Con-
stitution but simply offer a different, higher standard of protection for
women's rights. Thus, the United States proposed to follow its equal
protection jurisprudence even after ratifying CEDAW, despite the fact
that the Constitution would not be violated if the United States ad-
justed its laws to enable it to adhere to the CEDAW norm of equality.
The United States has created a range of CEDAW RUDs that suggest
that, behind the invocations of its Constitution, there lurks a banal
preference for upholding domestic laws and policies that afford
weaker protections for women's rights than are found in international
law.
Even where adopting CEDAW rights principles could seem to
jeopardize a constitutional principle, as is the case in relation to some
RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW
First Amendment issues, certain distinctions must be made. Analysis
shows that there is a difference between cases where a fundamental
principle of the constitutional scheme is at stake and ones where at
issue are judge-made rules with a heavy political component that may
shift with political trends and changing ideological orientations of
judges. Thus, when the United States says that the Constitution re-
quires giving priority to freedom of speech or freedom of religion over
the kind of equality rights assured by CEDAW, this position does not
simply flow from the text of the Constitution. Instead, political
choices are arguably being rationalized behind a constitutional facade.
Invoking the U.S. Constitution is for the most part sufficient to
quell doubts and debates about whether U.S. rights standards are fall-
ing behind advances elsewhere, because the Constitution has been
sacralized to the point that Americans cannot readily conceive of the
possibility that it might have become outmoded in its rights guaran-
tees. Americans will thus tend to presume that the disparities be-
tween the Constitution and international law reveal deficiencies in the
latter.
In the aftermath of the U.S. decision to invoke constitutional
standards to override the norm of full equality for women, questions
needed to be asked about the functions and meaning of the U.S. Con-
stitution. This was only one in a series of instances where the Consti-
tution had shown its serviceability as a bulwark that conservative
forces opposed to enhancing rights could deploy against international
law. Taking measure of this situation, would Americans approve of
the treatment of their Constitution as a device for circumscribing their
rights, an obstacle to integrating the higher rights protections that
were afforded to other peoples under international law? Are they un-
swervingly committed to the proposition that the Constitution-or,
more accurately, its hypertechnical jurisprudence-must govern at the
expense of international human rights law, regardless of whether this
means setbacks for their own rights?
Other questions were prompted by the U.S. reliance on the Con-
stitution to assure that CEDAW, if ever it were ratified, would not
afford U.S. women equality. The inadequacy of the rights principles
set forth in the Constitution in the wake of the defeat of the ERA was
part of the problem. In the absence of an ERA, the jurisprudence
applying the intermediate scrutiny standard under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is proving itself a poor substitute for a provision setting
forth women's right to equality. The prestige enjoyed by the U.S.
Constitution seems to have obscured how Equal Protection Clause
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rulings have reaffirmed existing inequalities and relied on sex stere-
otyping. Should any constitution devoid of principles that could en-
sure equality for over one half the nation remain as the definitive,
supreme standard of rights? Should the deficiencies in such an instru-
ment suffice as the pretext for denying U.S. women the equality they
would be guaranteed under CEDAW? Or, did the whole CEDAW
debacle illustrate the need to think more daringly and to consider
carefully Judge Nygaard's proposal for a new Bill of Rights?
One also wonders about the tolerant stance of the international
community vis-h-vis U.S. RUDs, many of them constitutional, to
human rights conventions. The United States seems to have benefit-
ted from a widespread presumption that, as the most assertive propo-
nent of human rights on the world scene, it must be in substantial
compliance with international human rights law-despite its insistence
on upholding domestic standards that varied significantly from the rel-
evant provisions of international law. It seems high time for the inter-
national community to reconsider its indulgent attitude vis-A-vis U.S.
non-compliance with international norms generally and, more specifi-
cally, to challenge the tactics being used by the United States to evade
any commitment to the principle of women's equality. In short, it
seems time to start taking human rights seriously.
The comments of Eckart Klein, the German expert who along
with other Human Rights Committee members examined the first
U.S. ICCPR report, provide a fitting capstone to this discussion. Af-
ter reviewing the U.S. approach to the question of its obligations
under the ICCPR, Klein made the following thoughtful observations:
The United States representatives had consistently focused on
the United States Constitution in their answers to the Commit-
tee, reflecting their Government's view that the Constitution al-
ready met all its obligations under the Covenant, with allowance
made for the reservations. The United States was right to be
proud of its Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, but it was
not the only decisive norm. The whole point of signing an inter-
national treaty was to enable a country to open up to ideas and
trends from the outside...
The democratic argument that the people did not want a
change had been put forward. But it was precisely the constitu-
tional thinking of the United States which had taught the world
that there were limits to the will of the majority. Human rights
in particular could not always be left to the discretion of majori-
ties. The signing of human rights treaties must represent the
Government's recognition of its duty to guide its people and
strive for change wherever needed. The world needed the
United States to lead the way in the promotion and protection
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of human rights, and it would do so best by fully accepting inter-
national standards and its own international human rights
responsibilities.473
473. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
SR.1406 (1995).
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